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I. INTRODUCTION
A central theme of international trade law is the tension between
economic and non-economic objectives. This tension underlies many
of the most divisive trade policy debates, and constantly challenges the
architects of international trade regimes.
In 1817, David Ricardo formulated the theory of comparative ad-
vantage to explain the benefits of international trade. Since that time,
most students of international trade policy have accepted the basic
premise of his theory of comparative advantage-the standard of liv-
ing of all trading partners will be maximized if each nation exports the
products that it produces most efficiently, and imports the products
that it produces least efficiently.'
Most western economists agree that national standards of living de-
cline whenever governments distort the natural flow of trade from
countries that enjoy comparative advantages in the production of par-
ticular products to countries that are subject to comparative disadvan-
tages. Nonetheless, trade-distorting measures abound in virtually
every national and international system of international trade law.
Other objectives (e.g., the preservation of national security, the protec-
tion of infant or declining industries, or the preservation of a particu-
lar way of life) must be accommodated in international trade
regulatory systems, and in some cases, may be considered more impor-
tant than national wealth-maximizing objectives.2
1. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLricAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(1817). To be certain, the debate on international economic theory did not end in
1817. Later day economists offered refinements and substituted "technological
gap" or "product cycle" theories for labor economics-based explanations of rela-
tive production efficiencies. See, e.g., BERTiL OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE (1933); MILTIADES CHACHOLIADES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
THEORY AND POLICY 305-06 (1978); EDWARD E. LEAmER, SOURCES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (1984). Hereinafter "comparative advantage"
will refer to all economic theories that accept the basic premise that the standard
of living of all trading partners will be enhanced by encouraging natural trade
flows from nations in which goods are produced relatively efficiently to nations in
which they are produced relatively inefficiently.
2. For the purpose of this article, the term "economic objectives" refers to macro-
economic goals of increasing national wealth. The term "non-economic objec-
tives" refers to other goals, including the micro-economic goals of particular indi-
viduals or industries that may be contrary to the interests of the national
economy as a whole. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 17-21
(1989) for a good general discussion of the competition between economic and
non-economic objectives in the formulation of trade policy.
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3 uses a
rules-oriented approach 4 to accommodate the contracting parties' 5
mix of economic and non-economic objectives. With the exception of
customs import duties (or tariffs), GATT generally prohibits national
measures that distort natural trade flows, including export subsidies,
import quotas and non-tariff trade barriers. At the same time, the
Contracting Parties have adopted numerous exceptions to these rules
to accommodate important non-economic objectives. For example,
Article XII of the General Agreement permits emergency import re-
strictions to safeguard balance of payments positions, Article XIX (the
"Escape Clause") authorizes import restraints to protect domestic in-
dustries imperiled by import competition and Article XXI allows re-
strictions against imports that threaten national security.6
For over forty years GATT policies relating to agricultural trade
tipped decisively in favor of non-economic objectives. Exceptions that
were built into, or were later grafted onto, the GATT system allowed
nations to impose quotas on agricultural imports, subsidize exports
and otherwise distort the natural flow of trade in these products. As a
result, current patterns of agricultural trade often have little to do
with comparative advantage.
3. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, orpenedfor signature Oct. 30,1947,
4 U.S.T. 639, T.IXA.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; Protocol of Provisional Applica-
tion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 4 U.S.T. 687,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. Since 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade has grown to include an interlocking series of over 100 international
agreements, tariff schedules, protocols and codes of conduct. Hereinafter
"GATT" will be used to refer collectively to these documents. The term "Gen-
eral Agreement" will be used to refer to the thirty-eight articles of the initial
GATT agreement, as amended-the basic rules by which the contracting parties
agreed to conduct their international trade.
4. For a discussion of GATT's rules-oriented approach to regulating international
trade, see John H. Jackson, Strengthening the International Legal Framework of
the GAT-MTN System: Reform Proposals for the New GATT Round, in THE NEw
GATT ROUND OF MULTLATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS (E. Petersman and M. Hilf eds., 1988)[hereinafter Strengthening the
Legal Framework]; John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal
Trade Order, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978).
5. In accordance with the standard convention, the term "Contracting Parties"
(with capitalization) will be used in this article to refer to the signatories to the
General Agreement acting formally as a body. The term "contracting parties"
(without capitalization) will be used to refer to signatories acting in their individ-
ual capacities.
6. General Agreement, supra note 3, at Art. XII, XIX, XXI. Each of these excep-
tions permits the imposition of restrictions against import sales which comply
with all requirements of GATT. Other provisions permit the imposition of re-
strictions against import sales which violate GATT rules, such as dumping prac-
tices and export subsidies. Id. at Art. VI.
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Saudi Arabia's status as a net exporter of wheat7 provides an intui-
tive example of the triumph of non-economic policies over principles
of comparative advantage. More precise indications of the gap be-
tween industrialized countries' farm programs and the principles of
comparative advantage can be found by measuring the transfers of
wealth from consumers to domestic farmers (primarily through
higher prices resulting from import restrictions) or from taxpayers to
domestic farmers (primarily through farm income support programs).
Estimates of the cost of these trade-distorting practices in the agricul-
tural trade sector range from $200 billion to almost $300 billion per
year.8
A diverse array of non-economic justifications have been formu-
lated to justify the cost of excluding agricultural trade from GATT's
mainstream trade rules including the following- (1) the environmen-
tal benefits of maintaining open spaces; (2) the maintenance of mini-
mum farm incomes as a means of insulating farmers from special risks
such as inclement weather, erratic domestic supply and demand condi-
tions and unstable world markets; (3) the social benefits of encourag-
ing people to stay on the farm; and (4) the political realities of
politicians' dependence on rural votes. Although the factors involved
in the formulation of farm policies vary from country to country,
many nations appear to have concluded that their interests are best
served by isolating their domestic agricultural markets from the vicis-
situdes of the international trading system.
Many of those non-economic objectives could be achieved through
the application of economic solutions. By providing farm income sup-
port through "decoupled" programs in which benefits are not tied to
the farmers' level of production, most agricultural nations could pro-
vide the financial support needed to keep farmers on the land, pre-
serve open spaces and maintain the vitality of rural areas, while
minimizing distortions of natural trade flows and decreasing the cost
of their farm programs.9
On the other hand, one crucial non-economic policy that conflicts
7. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRIcULTURE, AGRIcuURAL STATISTIcs 1988, 12 (Table
4)(1988)[hereinafter USDA STATISTICS].
8. See infra section IV.A.2.
9. Some trade officials and commentators have used the term "decoupled benefits"
interchangeably with "non-trade-distorting benefits." Strictly speaking, these
terms are not interchangeable. Any benefit that encourages the farmer to stay on
the farm and continue to produce, distorts international markets by increasing
the world supply of those products. As a matter of trade policy, however, the
distortions caused by decoupled programs would be acceptable to most propo-
nents of agricultural trade liberalization. For purposes of this article, the term
"non-trade-distorting" benefits or programs includes "decoupled" benefits and
other programs that minimize their distortions on international trade by severing
the linkage between production levels and benefits.
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with the application of GATT's basic free trade objectives-the desire
to insure food security--cannot be solved by economic means. Within
the lifetimes of millions of Japanese and West European citizens, a
large portion of the population was undernourished when World War
II curtailed food imports. Many Less Developed Countries (LDCs),
particularly those that are dependent upon a few export products for
foreign currency earnings, are concerned about their ability to pay for
food imports in a world market subject to unstable currency values
and commodity prices.10
Trade officials have made little progress in resolving the food se-
curity issue in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations." The
United States, supported by many LDCs and other industrialized
countries with relatively efficient agricultural producers, initially pro-
posed that national trade-distorting measures be phased out (or at
least reduced to minimal levels) over a ten year period as a means of
allowing efficient agricultural producers to exploit their comparative
advantages.12 Opposition to this proposal arose primarily from two
quarters. The European Economic Community (EEC) contended that
these proposals threaten the economic livelihood of European farmers
and the food security and self-sufficiency objectives of its Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP).'3 Similarly, while Japan reluctantly has
agreed to open most of its agricultural market to imports over the past
10. The decoupled farm income support proposal for maintaining current farm in-
come, while liberalizing agricultural trade, has underlying political concerns.
Current national farm income support programs are implemented through im-
port quotas or tariffs, causing consumers to bear the burden of the program by
paying higher prices for their food-which is far less obvious than when taxpay-
ers pay the cost through direct subsidy programs. Since the full cost of any
decoupled farm income support program would be in the form of an obvious sub-
sidy item in the budget, farmers have to be concerned that taxpayers might not be
willing to pay the price of the farm income support program in the future. More-
over, the prospects for maintaining that level of support (especially from legisla-
tors who represent largely urban districts) probably diminish when governments
experience chronic and massive budget deficits. Finally, even if that level of fi-
nancial support for farmers could be assured, decoupled benefits that would be
paid without regard to their production may sound too much like a welfare pro-
gram to hardworking people who seldom demand anything more than a "fair"
price for their products. Although this problem is as challenging as the food se-
curity issue, it will have to remain the subject of another article.
11. The current round of negotiations-the eighth in GATT's history-was launched
at a meeting of trade ministers from the contracting parties at Punta del Este,
Uruguay. KENNETH R. SsuoNDs & BRIAN H.W. HIM, LAW AND PRAcvnCE UNDER
THE GATT, IHA.3 (1988); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/1396 Press
Communique. It is commonly referred to as the Uruguay Round.
12. See infra section 11D.
13. See Opinion of the [EEC] Economic and Social Committee on the Current State
and Future Prospects of the GATT/Uruguay Round Negotiations as regards Agri-
culture and the Agro-food Sector, Art. 6; SIMONDs & HILL, supra note 11, at
§ M.B.4; 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1508 (Nov. 16, 1988).
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decade, it draws the line at importing rice-its basic food staple.14
As the Uruguay Round neared the end of the scheduled negotiat-
ing period in December of 1990, the contracting parties' trade minis-
ters had made little progress in bridging the gap between the initial,
and persistent, positions of the major agricultural exporters and im-
porters. Since the United States had linked an agreement on agricul-
tural trade issues to its acceptance of proposals on any and all other
items on the Uruguay Round agenda, the prospects for successfully
concluding the trade round were so dim that negotiations broke
down.15 Subsequently, the contracting parties extended the target
date for concluding the negotiations,16 and returned to the bargaining
table. By the summer of 1992, they still seemed far from agreement
on agricultural trade issues.
If this round of trade negotiations ends in failure, it is entirely pos-
sible that the result may not be a return to the status quo, but to an
increased reliance on protectionism reminiscent of trade policies that
were pursued between World War I and World War II. Other alterna-
tives include greater reliance on regional trading blocks, or the substi-
tution of a managed trade system for GATT's current rules-oriented
system.17 Thus, the western world's trading system may be poised at a
crossroads-with one road leading toward an expansion of GATT and
the other leading toward a search for alternatives to GATT. At this
juncture, therefore, the success or failure of the Uruguay Round agri-
cultural trade negotiations may play a key role in determining the fu-
ture of the entire GATT system.
In any event, the tension between comparative advantage princi-
ples and food security objectives will remain after the Uruguay Round
succeeds or fails. If a break-through in principle on agricultural trade
issues occurs, the contracting parties will have to implement those
agreements by establishing legal procedures to balance conflicting
objectives. If the Uruguay Round fails, and the current EEC/U.S. ag-
ricultural trade war continues unabated, sooner or later the cost of the
trade war will force trade officials to return to the task of finding a
way to accommodate economic efficiency and food security objectives.
The primary purpose of this article is to consider whether the dis-
pute between the advocates of agricultural trade liberalization and the
proponents of insuring food security inevitably must end in a dead-
lock, or whether their negotiators should be able to find common
14. 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1499 (Oct. 3, 1990). Japanese officials even prohibited
the display of U.S. rice samples at an international food trade fair near Tokyo. 8
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 475 (Mar. 27, 1991).
15. 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1876 (Dec. 12, 1990).
16. 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 470 (Mar. 27, 1991).
17. See ROBERT F. LrrAN & PETER SUCHMAN, U.S. Trade Policy at a Crossroad, 247
Sci. 31 (1990) for a brief discussion of these alternatives.
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ground within the basic framework of GATT's existing rules-oriented
system. This analysis begins with a review of the current agricultural
trade system, which insulates that sector of trade from GATT's main-
stream trade-discipline rules. Sections II and IHI trace the origins of
these rules and exceptions by reviewing the Western allies' post-
World War II international economic objectives, the incompatible na-
tional farm policies of many GATT contracting parties (primarily the
United States) that threatened GATIT's viability at several points in its
history, and other factors that removed agricultural trade from
GATT's mainstream.'s The analysis then moves on to an evaluation
of competing economic efficiency and food security objectives in Sec-
tion IV. To the extent possible, the economic costs of distorting natu-
ral agricultural trade flows are quantified, and compared to the
unquantifiable risks that nations incur when they cannot guarantee
adequate supplies of food from domestic sources during international
crises. Finally, Sections V and VI consider whether GATT's main-
stream trade-discipline rules, or adaptations of those rules, could ac-
commodate both GATT's basic economic efficiency objectives and
many contracting parties' legitimate food security objectives.
As will be discussed in this article, after an inauspicious beginning,
GATT has survived for over four decades by avoiding conflicts that
would have forced contracting parties to choose between a liberal
trade system that rewards comparative advantage and their funda-
mental non-economic objectives. For the most part, these conflicts
have been avoided by employing balancing mechanisms within the
system that require contracting parties to justify their derogations
from basic GATT principles, limit the scope of those derogations to
the minimum extent necessary to achieve legitimate objectives, and
provide compensation to trading partners that are adversely affected
by those actions. In this author's opinion, that flexibility should be
recognized, and employed to accommodate both the principle of com-
parative advantage and the legitimate concerns of many of its con-
tracting parties about their food security.
II. HISTORY OF GATT
A. The Establishment of Post-World War HI International Economic
Institutions
As World War II drew to a close and some of the Western allies'
statesmen began to turn their attention to post-war policies, they re-
called the post World War I experience. The war that was supposed to
end all wars, became a dress rehearsal for World War II twenty years
later.
18. Readers with a background in agricultural trade may wish to skip to section IV.
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During the first decade of the interregnum between the world
wars, the belligerents experienced disparate economic situations-
most of the Western allies' economies boomed, while Germany suf-
fered from runaway inflation rates, volatile currency exchange rates
and a substantial decline in its overall economic situation. By the sec-
ond half of the interregnum, the international economic system suf-
fered a worldwide collapse. In the wake of the stock market crash of
1929, Congress enacted the Smoot-Hawley Act of 193019 as a recession-
fighting measure. By sharply increasing U.S. import duty rates (to an
average ad valorem rate of approximately sixty percent), Congress in-
tended to shift demand from imported to domestic products, thereby
increasing employment opportunities for U.S. workers, and exporting
unemployment problems to our trading partners.
U.S. trading partners refused to cooperate, however. Many of the
other industrialized countries, which had experienced their own eco-
nomic declines, retaliated with a variety of programs to stimulate their
exports and inhibit their imports, including- increases in their import
duty rates, arbitrary manipulations of their currencies through deval-
uations and multiple currency systems, restrictions on the transfer of
foreign currency reserves, direct prohibitions on foreign purchases,
and other "beggar thy neighbor" policies.20
There are few issues on which economists agree, but most seem to
conclude that the successive rounds of protectionism that were un-
leashed in the 1930s were a major cause of the transformation of the
U.S. recession into a severe worldwide depression. Likewise, the
Western allies concluded that the international economic frictions of
the interregnum exacerbated the political and military disputes that
led to the resumption of warfare in 1939.21
The Western allies' plans for keeping the peace in the post-war era,
therefore, focused on economic, as well as political and military con-
cerns.22 Under the leadership of the United States and Great Britain,
the allies convened an international conference at Bretton Woods,
19. 46 Stat. 590, 672, 685; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1677(h).
20. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 31 for a discussion of the interwar period.
21. UNrrED STATES DEPARTmENT OF STATE, Pub. No. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR EXPAN-
SION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMERcIAL POLICY SERIES, 79 at 1, 2
(Nov. 1945)[hereinafter UNITED STATES PROPOSAL ]; see also Harry C Hawkins:
The Importance of International Commerce to Prosperity (radio broadcast by
Worldwide Broadcasting Foundation, Apr. 2, 1944) reprinted in UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Pub. No. 2104, COMMERCIAL PoLicY SERIES 74 at 3 (Apr.
1944).
22. The United Nations occupied a central, but not an exclusive, peace-keeping role
in the allies' vision of a post-war international order. As President Truman rec-
ognized in 1946: "The experience of cooperation in the task of earning a living
promotes both the habit and techniques of common effort and helps make perma-
nent the mutual confidence on which the peace depends. UNITED STATES PRO-
POSALS, supra note 21, at 1.
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New Hampshire in 1944, where they began the process of creating in-
ternational institutions to implement their objectives for cooperation
in economic policy during the post-war era.
During the Bretton Woods Conference, the allies got off to a good
start. They created the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development to help finance the rebuilding of Europe. In time, its
mission and that of its sister institution, the International Develop-
ment Association (which are referred to collectively as the World
Bank), shifted to the promotion of economic and social progress in de-
veloping countries by lending funds, providing advice and serving as a
catalyst to stimulate investments by others. The International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) was created to stabilize international currency ex-
change rates, and provide short or medium-term loans for nations
experiencing currency reserve problems.23
As successful as it was, the Bretton Woods Conference did not ad-
dress all of the allies' post-war international economic cooperation
objectives. The allies intended to follow up their Bretton Woods insti-
tution-building phase with the creation of a "third pillar in the institu-
tional structure of specialized agencies" to promote post-war economic
cooperation and reconstruction.24 U.S. State Department officials (af-
ter consulting with the British) proposed an International Trade Or-
ganization (ITO) to promote those objectives. That proposal was
outlined in a State Department pamphlet entitled Proposals for Ex-
pansion of World Trade and Employment in 1945,25 published in the
form of a draft charter in 1946, and amended in conferences held in
London, New York, Geneva and Havana between 1946 and 1948.26
By 1947, many of the negotiators had agreed to reduce import tar-
iffs at a Geneva tariff conference-before the full negotiating group
had finished creating an organization to administer the agreement.
Demonstrating their pragmatic nature, the negotiators recorded the
results of their tariff concessions, incorporated the commercial poli-
cies of the draft ITO charter into the agreement to insure that those
concessions would not be undercut by other trade measures, and en-
tered into a protocol of provisional acceptance of the resulting docu-
ment (the General Agreement).2 7
In 1948, delegates from fifty-four countries met in Havana to
amend the ITO charter one last time-producing the Havana Char-
23. For a good survey of the history and evolving objectives of the Ii=' and World
Bank see Sisters in the Wood, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991.
24. OLIVER LONG, LAw AND rrs LIMITATIoNs IN THE GATT MuLTLATERAL TRADE
SYSTFM 1 (1987).
25. UNITED STATES PROPOSALS, supra note 21, at 10 (reprinted in DEP'T ST. BuLL,
III at 912, 918 (1945)).
26. KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIc ORGANIZA-
TION 10-13 (1970).
27. Id.
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ter.28 They completed their assignment as architects of post-war in-
ternational economic policy by designing the planned third pillar in
the interconnected structure of international economic institutions,
but fell short when it came to building the planned institution. By
1948, the Cold War had intervened, and the United States and Great
Britain lost their enthusiasm for grand international institutions. In
current legislative terminology, the ITO Charter was dead upon its
arrival at the Havana Conference.
By necessity, the General Agreement (which had been accepted by
twenty-three contracting parties on a provisional basis) was forced
into service as the founding document for a system of coordinating
international trade and commercial policy during the post-war period.
Lacking an institution, GATT had to be enforced through a combina-
tion of voluntary compliance and direct action of the Contracting
Parties.
B. GATT's Impact on International Trade
The General Agreement employs four basic principles to discipline
international trade:
BINDING TARIFF CONCESSIONS. Reflecting its origins as an agreement on tar-
iffs, GATT provides a framework for periodic rounds of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations in which the contracting parties are urged to negotiate reciprocal
reductions in their tariff rates. When such agreements are reached, the par-
ties bind their tariffs (i.e., agree not to raise them above a stipulated level
unless and until changes are negotiated at a subsequent round of
negotiations).2 9
MOST-FAVORED NATION TREATMENT. As the General Agreement extends
most-favored-nation treatment to all contracting parties, once a tariff is bound
at a round of multilateral trade negotiations, the new, lower rate applies to all
of those parties.3 0
TRANSPARENCY. The General Agreement does not prohibit the use of all
trade-distorting measures; but, a review of its provisions reveals the Con-
tracting Parties' intent that any trade-distorting measures normally should be
confined to tariffs. In that form, they can be readily observed; their impact
can be quantified; and they can be reduced over time through binding mutual
tariff concessions. Trade practices that are designed to increase exports
through the award of export subsidies or to decrease imports through quotas
or non-tariff barriers are prohibited or discouraged.3 1
CONSULTATION AND CONCILIATION. Finally, the General Agreement requires
the contracting parties to advise each other of trade problems, consult with
each other and use GATT dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve their
trade disputes.3 2
By most measures, GATT has successfully decreased national in-
28. Final Act and Related Documents on the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948).
29. General Agreement, supra note 3, at Art. II.
30. Id. at Art. I.
31. Id. at Art. III, VI, VIII, IX, XI, XVI, XVII and XVIII.
32. Id. at Art. XXII and XXIII.
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terference with natural trade flows resulting from the forces of com-
parative advantage. 33 Over the course of three decades and seven
subsequent rounds of multilateral trade negotiations conducted under
GATT's auspices, the Contracting Parties steadily reduced their im-
port tariff rates. Average U.S. tariffs on dutiable manufactured im-
ports, for example, dropped from about fifteen percent in 1948 to less
than six percent after the Tokyo Round negotiations of 1979.34 Some
nations maintain even lower tariffs. Japan, for example, maintains a
comparable average tariff rate of less than five percent.35
As these tariff barriers (and some non-tariff barriers) to trade de-
creased, the volume of international trade increased significantly. Be-
tween 1963 and 1983, for example, the annual rate of growth of world
exports has been about fifty percent greater than the growth in total
world output.36
Although the United States was the principal architect of GATT,
by the mid-1980s--as the United States experienced substantial and
persistent trade deficits-our trade officials concluded that GATT's in-
ternational trade rules had become inadequate to meet our needs in
the modern world economy.
Since trade in manufactured products generally is subject to
GATT's discipline, nations enjoying a comparative advantage in manu-
facturing industries are able to exploit that advantage close to its full
potential. For many mature, labor-intensive industries requiring rou-
tinized manufacturing skills, however, the United States does not en-
joy a comparative advantage in labor, capital or other crucial factors of
production.
In other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, services and
high-technology manufacturing however, trade officials concluded
that the United States has retained its comparative advantage. Unfor-
tunately (from the U.S. perspective), those are among the sectors of
trade in which GATT discipline is weakest or non-existent. Most of
GATT's principles do not cover trade in agriculture; GATT does not
apply to trade in services; and in the opinion of the United States it
provides inadequate protection for patents, copyrights and other forms
of intellectual property that facilitate profitable transfers of technol-
ogy. In other words, for those trade sectors in which the United States
is often subject to a comparative disadvantage, GATT has been reason-
ably effective in prohibiting protectionist measures that distort the
natural flow of trade from trading partners enjoying comparative ad-
vantages to the United States-the largest consumer market in the
33. Strengthening the Legal Framework, supra note 4, at 17.
34. PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL EcONOMY 226 (1985).
35. GENERAL AGREFmENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1983/84 at
2 (Table 1)(1984).
36. Id. at 2 (see appendix Table 1).
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world. For many sectors of trade in which we enjoy a comparative
advantage, however, GATT has been ineffective in disciplining the use
of trade restraints to distort the flow of trade from the United States
to trading partners with comparative disadvantages. 37
As the U.S. trade deficit worsened, three totally different policy
approaches were advocated by economists, trade officials, interna-
tional trade lawyers and other commentators. One approach was to
expand GATT's rules-oriented system to categories of trade of increas-
ing importance to the United States, such as agriculture, high-tech
products and services, and to strengthen the overall functioning of the
GATT system. A diametrically opposed proposal was to admit that
GATT's rules-oriented system is a failure, abandon it, and substitute a
managed trade (or results-oriented) approach. A third faction pro-
posed that the United States organize a regional trading block (along
the lines of the EEC) as a primary means of insuring fair and efficient
trading relations.38
U.S. trade officials adopted the first approach by calling for a new
round of multilateral trade negotiations to consider its proposals for
expanding and strengthening GATT's rules-oriented approach. Im-
pliedly, however, it retained the option of abandoning GATT, or ac-
cepting its decline into an increasingly irrelevant system, if the
negotiations failed to produce satisfactory reforms.
C. The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
In September of 1986, trade ministers from GATT's Contracting
Parties met in Punta Del Este, Uruguay to launch the Uruguay
Round. The United States concerns about the continued vitality of
GATT were reflected in the agenda for Uruguay Round negotiations,
set forth in the Ministerial Declaration of September 20, 1986.39 It be-
gan by stating that Uruguay Round negotiations should aim to:
- bring about further liberalization and expansion of world trade to the
benefit all countries, especially less-developed Contracting Parties, in-
cluding the improvement of access to markets by the reduction and elimi-
nation of tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff measures
and obstacles;
- strengthen the role of GATT, improve the multilateral trading system
based on the principles and rules of the GAT and bring about a wider
coverage of world trade under agreed, effective and enforceable multilat-
eral disciplines;
- increase the responsiveness of the GATT system to the evolving interna-
tional economic environment... ; and
- foster concurrent cooperative action at the national and international
37. U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills estimates that one-third of world trade
(valued at approximately $1 trillion) is not subject to any effective international
trade rules. 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 789 (June 6, 1990).
38. LiTAN & SUCHMAN, supra note 17.
39. SIMONDS & HILL, supra note 11.
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levels to strengthen the inter-relationship between trade policies and
other economic policies affecting growth and development.
4 °
Uruguay Round negotiators broke down the agenda into fifteen
separate topics (each of which was addressed by a separate negotiating
group). These topics included: agriculture, subsidies and counter-
vailing measures, trade in services, trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPS), tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical prod-
ucts, natural resource-based products, textiles and clothing, GATT ar-
ticles, safeguards, MTN (Multilateral Trade Negotiations) agreements
and arrangements, dispute settlement, functioning of the GATT sys-
tem (FOGS) and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS).41
D. Uruguay Round Agricultural Trade Negotiations
As the declaration turned from general objectives to more specific
subjects for the agricultural negotiations, it stated that: "Contracting
Parties agree that there is an urgent need to bring more discipline and
predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing
restrictions and distortions including those related to structural sur-
pluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and instability in
world agricultural markets."42
The United States submitted a sweeping proposal for bringing
more discipline to agricultural trade. In brief summary, the United
States proposal emphasized five main points:
1. Import access would be liberalized through a tariffication procedure. In
the first stage, each contracting party would adopt tariffs for each agricultural
product which would achieve the same level of protection as all current im-
port quotas and non-tariff barriers. Then, over a period of ten years, the con-
tracting parties would phase out those tariffs through a frequent series of
multilateral negotiating sessions.
2. Export subsidies would be phased out over a five year period.
3. Trade-distorting internal farm income support programs (i.e., farm pro-
grams which link benefits farmers receive to the amount of agricultural prod-
ucts that they produce) would be phased out over a five year period.
4. The Contracting Parties would adopt uniform food health and safety regu-
lations (in Uruguay Round terminology "sanitary and phyto-sanitary rules")
to ensure that health and safety standards are not employed as non-tariff
trade barriers.
5. Special and differential rules would be applied to LDCs, enabling them to
obtain liberalized access to markets in developed countries without being re-
quired to adopt reciprocal measures until their economies attained higher
stages of development.4 3
By the scheduled conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December of
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id. at 29-32.
42. Id. at 29.
43. The United States submitted its agricultural trade liberalization proposal at the
GATT mid-term review session in 1989. That proposal is reprinted at 6 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1395-99 (Oct. 25, 1989), [hereinafter U.S. Agricultural Trade
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1990, little progress had been made in reconciling the positions of the
major agricultural producers and importers. The United States scaled
back its proposal to a ninety percent reduction in export subsidies and
a seventy-five percent reduction in domestic subsidies. The Cairns
Group-a group of fourteen self-proclaimed agricultural free trad-
ers-generally supported the U.S. proposal.44 The EEC proposed a
thirty percent reduction in domestic and export subsidies over a ten
year period beginning in 1985 (thus taking into account existing reduc-
tions from its peak levels of subsidization).45 Japan still objected to
any revisions in GATT that would obligate it to open its domestic mar-
ket to rice imports.46 By the summer of 1992, despite the occasional
optimistic communique and the GATT General Directors' attempt to
break the deadlock by offering his own detailed compromise proposal
to the negotiators,47 no further progress in reconciling those positions
had been reported.48
III. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND GATT'S
AGRICULTURAL TRADE PROVISIONS
By the time the contracting parties' agricultural trade negotiators
arrived at Punta del Este, the opportunity had long passed (if it had
ever existed) for them to be guided by the allies' post-war principles of
comparative advantage, disciplined trade practices and economic inter-
dependence. In 1947 or 1948, the contracting parties might have had
the opportunity to bring their national legislation in line with GATT's
objectives and rules---as was the case for most sectors of the economy
that are disciplined effectively by GATT. Instead, they designed
GATT to conform to existing domestic agricultural programs, espe-
cially those of the United States. 4 9 GATT's agricultural trade rules
(including provisions of the original General Agreement and subse-
quent amendments, waivers and codes), therefore, must be considered
in the context of the agricultural policies of the United States and
other major trading nations.
Proposal]. A good summary of the proposal is provided in USDA, GATIT TRADE
LIBERALIZATION: THE U.S. PRoPosAL (ERS Bulletin No. 596; Mar. 1990).
44. USDA, GAYT Uruguay Round Highlights 3 (May 7,1990).
45. 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1724 (Nov. 14, 1990).
46. Prime Minister Kaifu was still resisting intense pressure from the United States
and other teaching partners to eliminate its near total ban on rice imports in the
summer of 1991. 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1042 (July 10, 1991).
47. 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 38 (Jan. 1, 1992).
48. This very brief overview is presented to provide a context for the issue of
whether a liberal agricultural trade system can accommodate both comparative
advantage principles and legitimate food security concerns-the merits of any
particular Uruguay Round proposal is not addressed.
49. DALE E. HATHAWAY, AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT: REWRTNG THE RULES 103,
104 (Institute For International Economics, Policy Analyses in International Eco-
nomics, Nov. 20, 1987).
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A. National Agricultural Policies of Principal Contracting Parties in
1947
The United States Government has been involved in agricultural
policy since the early days of the republic; but for most of our history
this policy was debated, enacted and implemented with little regard
for international trade implications. Until the early 1930s, the federal
government did not intervene in domestic or international agricul-
tural markets to any appreciable extent. Probably its greatest impact
on U.S. agriculture was the development of an agricultural infrastruc-
ture through legislation that encouraged the rapid settlement of pub-
lic lands outside the original colonies, the construction of railroads and
the establishment of land grant colleges.50
During the Great Depression, however, the federal government
adopted activist agricultural programs in response to the collapse of
farm prices in the United States.5 1 Beginning with the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933,52 the federal government attempted to shore
up farm incomes through depression era legislation that brought
about large-scale interventions into the production and marketing of
agricultural products. Price support programs provided nonrecourse
loans to eligible farmers at a specified minimum price for the crop. If
the market price exceeds the specified price, the farmer sells his crop
in the market and uses the proceeds to pay off his loan; if the market
price is less than the specified price, he discharges his debt by forfeit-
ing the crop to the government.5 3 To keep costs under control, Con-
gress also authorized the Department of Agriculture to impose
production controls. Producers receiving price support assistance are
required to reduce the harvested acreage of the price-supported
crops.54
From the U.S. perspective, therefore, the General Agreement's ag-
ricultural trade rules had to permit the contracting parties to manipu-
late supply and demand within their countries through price supports
and rigid production controls. The inward-looking programs that pro-
50. J. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of Compaarative Advantage: The Prospects for
Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GAT2 Negotiations, 30
HARV. INT'L. L.J. 123, 131 (1989).
51. HATHAWAY, supra note 49, at 81.
52. 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.
53. The loan amount could be set at an amount that merely evened out seasonal price
fluctuations, or at a amount that compensated farmers at some level in excess of
prevailing market price. When the loan amount is fixed in excess of market
prices, the federal government determines bath the purchase price (when it takes
title to the forfeited crop) and the sales price (when it resells the crop to a food
processor).
54. See J.W. LOONEY ET A., AGRICULTURAL LAW: A LAWYER'S GUIDE FOR REPRE-
SENTING FARmi CLIENTS 196-215 (1990) for a concise summary of current U.S. farm
price and income support programs.
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vided the foundation for U.S. agricultural policy (and remain in cur-
rent U.S. farm legislation) reflected the interests of a domestically
oriented constituency that had little interest in international
markets.55
B. Exceptions for Agricultural Trade in the 1947 General Agreement
Due to the bargaining position and leadership role of the United
States, the Contracting Parties accorded special treatment to agricul-
tural trade from the outset. In fact, the realization that the U.S. Sen-
ate would not ratify an agreement that required the United States to
dismantle its agricultural programs (or made them ineffective),
shaped the General Agreement's agricultural trade provisions.5 6 In
attempting to make the GATT system compatible with U.S. agricul-
tural programs, however, the Contracting Parties had to insulate agri-
cultural trade from a significant portion of the General Agreement's
basic principles.
1. Quantitative Restrictions
Article XI.1 of the General Agreement prohibits the use of quanti-
tative restrictions (import or export quotas) except in a few specified
circumstances. Some of these exceptions apply to all imports (e.g., Ar-
ticle XII permits the use of quotas to preserve scarce foreign reserves
in a balance of payments crisis); but most of the exceptions relate
solely to trade in agricultural products. In particular, Article XI.2(c)
provides that the prohibitions of Article XI.1 shall not extend to im-
port restrictions on agricultural products necessary to the enforce-
ment of governmental programs that operate to restrict the
production of agricultural products or to remove temporary surpluses
from the market. A contracting party invoking Article X1.2(c) how-
ever, was required to restrict domestic supplies proportionately in or-
der to maintain relative domestic and foreign shares of the market.57
A comparison of the terms of Article XI and relevant portions of
U.S. law reveals the careful drafting of exceptions to the General
Agreement's basic rules to avoid conflicts with then current U.S. agri-
cultural programs. The exceptions to GATT's general prohibition on
the use of quantitative restrictions contained in Article XI.2(c) were
tailor-made for then current U.S. price support and production control
programs.58
55. See generally Daniel G. Amstutz, U.S. Farm Policy and International Agricul-
tural Markets, 17 CASE W. REs. 321 (1985)(a good historical perspective on U.S.
farm policy and its impact on international agricultural trade markets).
56. HATHAWAY, supra note 49, at 103.
57. General Agreement, supra note 3, at Art. XI.2(c).
58. HATHAWAY, supra note 49, at 109.
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2. The Section 22 Waiver
By the early 1950s, however, it became apparent that although Ar-
ticle XI was "largely tailor-made to United States requirements... the
tailors cut the cloth too fine."5 9 More precisely, the suit fit when the
cloth was cut in 1947, because the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
originally imposed import controls on agricultural products only when
supply controls were imposed upon domestic products as well. When
later amendments authorized the imposition of import controls on
dairy products without accompanying domestic supply controls, the
Netherlands observed that the suit no longer fit and filed a complaint
with GATT. The Contracting Parties eventually found that the U.S.
import quotas violated Article XI.60 In 1950, however, Congress re-
sponded to the complaint by amending Section 22 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act to provide that no trade agreement of the United
States could be implemented in a manner that would be contrary to
the requirements of that legislation.61
With the possibility that the major economic power in the world
might be forced to withdraw from GATT looming over the Con-
tracting Parties, they granted the United States a broad waiver pursu-
ant to Article XXV. Commonly known as the Section 22 waiver, it
authorizes the United States to impose quantitative restraints when
imports render ineffective, or tend to render ineffective, U.S. farm
programs or substantially reduce the amount of any product subject to
such programs.62 Pursuant to this waiver, the United States has im-
posed import quotas on cotton, peanuts, dairy products, oats, rye and
other products.63
3. Subsidy Rules
The ambivalence that many nations exhibit toward the subsidy is-
sue is reflected in the tortuous history of GATT's subsidy rules. On
the one hand, all nations spend tax revenues to provide some subsidies
to their producers-public roads, bridges and ports are examples of
near universal business subsidies. Many nations provide subsidies to
59. DAM, supra note 26, at 270.
60. Stefan Tangermann, Proposals for a "Rules-Oriented" Liberalization of Interna-
tional Agricultural Trade, in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (1988).
61. Even with its precarious status as an unratified provisional agreement, it is rea-
sonably clear that, for purposes of U.S. domestic law, the later legislation would
prevail over the inconsistent provisions of the earlier agreement.
62. Waiver granted to the United States in connection with Import Restrictions Im-
posed Under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act, as
amended, Decision of Mar. 5, 1955 (GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, BISD 32 (3d ed. Supp. 1955)).
63. See RALPH HAUGHWOUT FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACTIONS
1026 (1988).
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encourage businesses to locate in areas of high unemployment, to
stimulate economic development or to promote other social and eco-
nomic objectives. On the other hand, most nations object when their
competitors artificially enhance their producers' competitiveness in
world markets by directly assuming a portion of their costs of
production.
Originally, the General Agreement contained only the provisions
now found in Article XVI.1. These provisions merely require the sub-
sidizing nation to report "any subsidy, including any form of income or
price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports
of any product from, or reduce imports of any product into its terri-
tory, to other parties."6 4 Later, as it became evident that export subsi-
dies significantly distort natural trade patterns, Article XVI was
amended to prohibit contracting parties from granting export subsi-
dies on manufactured products which result in the sale of the product
for export at less than the comparable domestic price,6 5 and restrain
their use of export subsidies for primary products (including agricul-
tural products) to gain "more than an equitable share of world export
trade."6 6
More recently, the primary product export subsidy issue was ad-
dressed in the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code-which has been signed
by approximately one-fourth of the contracting parties. In adopting
that code, the signatories attempted to improve Article XVI around
the margins by defining an "equitable share" in the context of the dis-
placement of traditional exporters in particular primary product ex-
port markets by competitors who receive export subsidies.67
4. Unbound Tariffs
Finally, many tariffs on agricultural products are unbound, and set
64. HATHAWAY, supra note 49, at 105.
65. General Agreement, supra note 3, at Art. XVI.4.
66. Article XVI.3 states:
Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies
on the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party
grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to in-
crease the export of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party
having more than an equitable share of world trade in that product, ac-
count being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in
the product during a previous representative period, and any special fac-
tors which may have affected or be affecting such trade in the products.
General Agreement, supra note 3, at Art. XVI.3.
67. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Apr. 12, 1979,
31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at Article X, reprinted in GENERAL AGREEMENTS
ON TARRIFFs AND TRADE, BASIC INsTRUMENTs AND SELECTED DocuMENTs 56, 69
(26th Supp. 1980)[hereinafter GATT Subsidies Code].
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at levels that significantly distort natural trade patterns. In 1983, for
example, applied tariffs for eleven market economies averaged 3.0
percent for all imported items and 5.3 percent for food products. For
LDCs, the disparity was even more pronounced-2.7 percent for all
imports and 5.5 percent for food products. In addition, developed
countries generally subject a far greater percentage of agricultural im-
ports to non-tariff barriers than manufactured imports.6 8
Although U.S. agricultural policy was inward-looking during this
period, its impact was not limited to domestic markets. Section 22 im-
port quotas obviously distorted trade in products covered by those quo-
tas by shifting sales from foreign producers enjoying comparative
advantages to higher-cost U.S. producers. Somewhat less obviously,
combinations of domestic price supports, deficiency payment pro-
grams and tariffs on competing imports diminished opportunities for
low cost foreign producers to fully exploit their comparative advan-
tages in the U.S. market. Production control programs have the oppo-
site effect on international trade by decreasing the amount of U.S.
agricultural products available for export.69
C. United States Agricultural Policies after 1947
In 1954, with the adoption of the Food for Peace Program, more
commonly known as PL-480,70 the federal government began to inter-
vene more directly in foreign markets. PL-480, as amended, permits
the distribution of surplus U.S. food to nations in need under three
different programs: Title I authorizes export sales under concessional
terms (twenty to forty year loans at interest rates as low as two or
three percent); Title II authorizes grants of food for humanitarian pur-
poses; and Title HI permits loans to be forgiven if the recipient coun-
try agrees to use local currencies generated by selling Title I food to its
citizens for agricultural development purposes.71
Congress was guided, in part, by humanitarian considerations
when it enacted PL-480. After witnessing the positive contribution of
U.S. food shipments to post-war reconstruction efforts in Western Eu-
rope and Japan, it seemed only natural to use some portion of U.S.
farm surpluses to feed hungry people in LDCs.72 But, Congress was
68. Z=Tz AND VALDES, AGRiCULTURE IN THE GATT: AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO REFORM 15 (International Food Policy Research Institute, Re-
search Report No. 70, 1988).
69. Amstutz, supra note 55, at 325.
70. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, 7
U.S.C. § 1701(a) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). The Food
for Peace title was applied to this legislation by the Food for Peace Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-808, 80 Stat. 1526.
71. Id.
72. L. Mayer, U.S. Policies affecting International Trade, 17 CASE W. RES. 421, 425
(1985).
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also influenced by the positive impact of those programs on the U.S.
farmers who supplied the food transferred to needy nations. Since
1954, PL-480 has accounted for U.S. agricultural exports in the neigh-
borhood of $1 billion per year.7 3
Although PL-480 was viewed as a surplus disposal program when it
was enacted in 1954, in retrospect, it was one of the early signs of a
shift in agricultural policies. During the depression and early post-
war years, the federal government had relied primarily on strict pro-
duction control measures to bring domestic supply and control into
balance, and thereby assure adequate farm income. Starting with the
enactment of PL-480, Congress gradually began to rely more upon
market-oriented policies and the expansion of markets for U.S. agri-
cultural products to assure adequate farm incomes.
In 1963, the shift in U.S. agricultural policy became more apparent
when the federal government responded to the wheat producers' re-
jection of a mandatory acreage control program by loosening produc-
tion controls. Over the course of the next ten years, the federal
government shifted the emphasis of its farm income support programs
from a system of relatively high price supports and tight production
controls to a deficiency payment system.74
Although the federal government supported farm income by guar-
anteeing that eligible farmers would receive specified minimum prices
for their crops under both programs, the deficiency payment program
places increased reliance on the market as a determinant of farm in-
come. Eligible producers sell on the open market, and receive defi-
ciency payments if average prices for their commodities (which may
be different from the prices they actually received) are less than speci-
fied target prices. Thus, with a deficiency payment system, the mar-
ket determines the price of eligible commodities (unlike the price
support system) even if domestic farmers receive coupled benefits
under both farm programs.
By enacting the Food for Peace Act of 1966, Congress again sought
to increase U.S. farm income by promoting export sales. The original
legislation authorized the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to
provide short and intermediate-term financing for commercial exports
of eligible U.S. agricultural products. Later amendments added ex-
port loan guarantees and blended credits (combinations of guarantees
and financing) to the CCC's arsenal of export promotional programs. 75
As a result of these shifts in U.S. agricultural policies, American
farmers were well positioned to take advantage of a sudden upsurge in
demand for food imports in the 1970s. For several years, U.S. farmers
73. See USDA STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 510 (Table 693), 512 (Table 703), 563 (Ta-
ble 778), 579 (Table 779), 588 (Table 815), 602 (Table 833)(1988).
74. Amstutz, supra note 55, at 323.
75. 7 U.S.C. § 1707(a)(Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 71:368
1992] FOOD SECURITY CONCERNS 389
steadily devoted additional acreage to production, and foreign import-
ers absorbed all they could produce.7 6 In 1973, U.S. agricultural ex-
ports jumped by about $7.4 billion over the previous year (in constant
1983 dollars). Between 1973 and 1981, they continued to increase at a
rate of approximately $1.7 billion per year, as compared to an average
annual increase of about $415 million from 1940 to 1972 (again in con-
stant 1983 dollars).77
This "Golden Age" for U.S. agricultural exports was characterized
by a number of favorable conditions: fairly widespread growth in the
world economy, a relatively low value for the dollar in relation to ma-
jor foreign currencies, easy credit, and increased financial liquidity oc-
casioned by the recycling of petrodollars.78 Although the United
States was involved in several agricultural trade disputes on alleged
foreign protectionist measures, such as the EEC's variable levy and
Japan's import quotas, it was able to exploit its comparative advantage
fairly effectively during this period.
The "Golden Age" did not last very long. By the early 1980s,
growth in the world economy slowed substantially, and declined in a
number of debt-burdened LDCs, the value of the dollar increased in
relation to major foreign currencies, and foreign competition in-
creased. U.S. agricultural exports plummeted from their high point of
$43.7 billion in 1981 to $26.3 billion by 1986-a decline of almost forty
percent.79 This spurred U.S. trade negotiators to scrutinize our major
trading partners' agricultural policies more closely, and to escalate our
objections to those policies which limited our agricultural producers'
ability to penetrate foreign markets.
D. Japanese Agricultural Policies after 1947
Japanese trade policy in the immediate post-war era was influ-
enced by both its wartime experience and the reconstruction policies
of the United States occupation government. During the decade after
the end of the war, Japan developed as a trading nation by importing
raw materials, protecting its domestic industry through high tariffs
and import quotas, and providing incentives to promote exports of
manufactured products. It protected its scarce foreign reserves by
adopting foreign exchange controls.8 0
Although Japan positioned itself to become a major industrial
power through its policy of simultaneously protecting infant domestic
76. Mayer, supra note 72, at 426.
77. Amstutz, supra note 55, at 325.
78. Id.
79. USDA STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 503 (Table 689).
80. AUSTRAUAIN BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS POLICY
MONOGRAPH No. 3, JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL POLIcIES 9 (1988)[hereinafter JAP-
ANESE AGRICULTURAL POLICIES].
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industries from import competition while providing incentives for ex-
porters of manufactured products, during the immediate post-war era
it relied upon an agricultural base. The agricultural economy (includ-
ing forestry and fishing) accounted for about twenty-five percent of its
gross national product, and close to half of its labor force.8 1 The prin-
ciple objectives of its agricultural policies (which were reflected in its
Staple Food Program of 1942, its Land Reform Program of 1946 and its
Agricultural Cooperative Program of 1948) were the following: to pro-
vide staple food supplies and alleviate hunger, to carry out national
land reform, to create rural employment opportunities, and to democ-
ratize rural society.8 2
Shortly after the United States occupation of Japan ended in
1952,83 the U.S. sponsored Japanese accession to GATT. As a result of
the United States leadership, Japan acceded to GATT on a provisional
basis in 1953, and became a full member in 1955. Not all major trading
nations, however, shared the United States enthusiasm for extending
GATT membership to Japan. Fourteen countries, including the
United Kingdom, France and other major trading nations, exercised
their right under Article 35 of the General Agreement to refuse to
apply GATT in their trade relations with Japan. By the early 1970s,
however, most of the major trading nations had accepted Japan as a
full member of GATT.84
As a contracting party, Japan gradually began to liberalize its trade
policies. Of the 1,143 commodities subject to import quotas in 1960, 161
remained in 1963 and 79 remained in 1980.85 By the mid 1970s, Japa-
nese import duties were lower than those of most other trading
nations. 86
Until very recently, however, Japan resisted pressure to eliminate
agricultural import quotas for agricultural products on food security
grounds. It retained "residual" quotas (i.e., quotas not permitted
under GATT) on twenty-two agricultural products through the mid-
1980s.8 7 In 1987, Japan responded to a GATT panel decision (initiated
by a complaint from the United States) that its quotas on ten agricul-
tural products were in violation of its GATT obligations8 8 by eliminat-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 10.
83. Thomas K. McCraw, From Partners to Competitors: An Overview of the Period
since World War II, in AMERICA vERsus JAPAN, (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1986).
84. Komiya & Itoh, Japan's International Trade and Trade Policy, 1955-1984, in THE
PoLrrIcAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN 178 (1988).
85. Id. at 192.
86. Id. at 193.
87. Komlya & Itoh, supra note 84, at 206.
88. 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1382 (Nov. 11, 1987).
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ing its quotas on eight of the ten items.8 9 In 1988, Japan liberalized its
quotas on beef and oranges, promising to phase them out entirely
within a few years, pursuant to a bilateral agreement with the United
States. By the time the Uruguay Round began, Japan's near total ban
on rice imports remained as the major point of contention between it
and the major agricultural exporters.9 0
E. EEC Agricultural Policy after 1947
Although one of the most basic GATT principles is most-favored-
nation treatment for all contracting parties, Article XXIV of the Gen-
eral Agreement authorizes the creation of customs unions and free
trade areas, which require members to extend better than most-fa-
vored treatment to each other. In both of these forms of international
economic integration the members eliminate virtually all tariffs and
quantitative restrictions for imports from other members.9 '
In 1957, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy relied upon Article XXIV in cre-
ating the EEC through the Treaty of Rome.92 After the Treaty of
Rome was ratified and the Common Customs Tariff was introduced,
the EEC replaced its individual member states as the legal entity with
responsibility for compliance with GATT.93
The founders of the EEC went beyond the usual customs union
tariff-harmonization stage by establishing common commercial poli-
cies to govern trade among members of the trade block and with non-
member nations.94 In particular, the agricultural nations of the EEC
(most notably, France) insisted upon the establishment of common ag-
ricultural policies that would protect the interests of their farmers in
the new economic environment. In large part, the objectives of the
agricultural nations of the EEC were similar to those of the United
States during the depression-to ensure an adequate income for farm-
ers. Unlike the United States, however, Western Europe had exper-
89. ITSUO MATSUSHITA & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTEREST AND
TRADE AND INvEsTMENT LAw 76-77 (1988).
90. Id.
91. In free trade areas, each member continues to apply its own tariffs to imports
from non-member countries, while in customs unions, the organization applies a
common external tariff to imports from non-member countries.
92. The EEC was established by The Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (more commonly known as the
'Treaty of Rome"). It is one of three institutions which comprises the European
Community-the others being the European Steel and Coal Commission and the
Atomic Energy Community.
93. International Fruit Co. N.V. and Others v. Produktschapvoor Groenten en Fruit
(No. 3), 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 16 Com. Mlkt. L.I 1; Administrazione
Delle Finance Dello Stato v. SPI and SAMI, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 801, 39
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 354.
94. Treaty of Rome, supra note 92, at Art. 3.
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ienced severe food shortages during and shortly after World War II.95
Reflecting this experience, one of the basic objectives of the CAP,
which is memorialized in the Treaty of Rome, is to assure the "availa-
bility of supplies."96
The EEC has organized four market organizations, each of which is
responsible for a specific segment of the agricultural economy, to ad-
minister the CAP. Some of the market organizations guarantee mini-
mum prices for EEC farmers through an intervention mechanism.
Using the archetypal cereal regime as an example, the market organi-
zation establishes several prices for the commodities it regulates. The
target price is a politically determined price designed to return a "fair"
profit to EEC producers. It is used as a base for determining other
specified prices, including the intervention price, which is the mini-
mum that the EEC guarantees to its farmers by buying their products
at that price whenever the market price slips below that level. To in-
sure that lower-priced imports do not disrupt internal markets, all
EEC marketing organizations impose variable levies. Under this sys-
tem, the market organization sets a threshold price, which is set
slightly below the target price (to reflect internal EEC transportation
costs) and imposes a tariff equal to the amount required to raise the
delivered price of the imported product at Rotterdam to the threshold
price.97
For close to twenty years, the EEC variable levy and other protec-
tionist aspects of its CAP did not provoke many official complaints
from other contracting parties, despite its questionable validity under
GATT. Many of the contracting parties accepted the EEC's position
that since most of its agricultural tariffs are unbound, the variable
levy does not violate its tariff concessions.9 8 Although the variable
levy can have the same effect as an impermissible import quota, some
contracting parties may be reluctant to question the practice in view of
the United States Section 22 waiver. Others recognize that it would be
inadvisable to challenge the variable levy while they were engaged in
similar practices.99
95. See HATHAWAY, supra note 49, at 2, 72; J. Bentil, Attempts to Liberalize Interna-
tional Trade in Agriculture and the Problem of the External Aspects of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community, 17 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 335, 354 (1985); KTrr S. PARiKH, TOWARDS FREE TRADE IN AGRi-
cULTURE 23 (1988).
96. Treaty of Rome, supra note 92, at Art. 39.1(d). The other basic objectives cited in
the treaty are: to increase agricultural productivity; to ensure a fair standard of
living for the agricultural community; to stabilize markets; and to ensure that
supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. Id. at Art. 39.1.
97. W. Boger, The United States - European Community Agricultural Export Subsi-
dies Dispute, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 173, 192-98 (1984); SIMON HARRIS, ET
AL., THE FOOD AND FARm POucIEs OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY, 44-45 (1983).
98. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 131.
99. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 63.
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In any event, although the CAP isolated EEC farmers and consum-
ers from the world market, few contracting parties seemed particu-
larly concerned as long as the EEC remained a large net importer of
major agricultural commodities. By the late 1970s, however, the EEC
was well on its way to exceeding the self-sufficiency level for many
basic agricultural products.100 Since EEC agricultural products were
produced at costs in excess of world market prices, the CAP was ex-
panded to provide export subsidies as a means of selling those sur-
pluses in foreign markets at prevailing world market levels.10 1 With
the assistance of these subsidies, the EEC quickly became a major ex-
porter of wheat, dairy products and other agricultural commodities-
and in the process displaced traditional exporters in foreign markets.
F. The United States/EEC Trade War
As foreign markets were lost to the EEC in the early 1980s, repre-
sentatives of U.S. agricultural interests responded on several different
levels. At the bilateral level, U.S. trade authorities attempted to per-
suade the EEC to eliminate, or at least reduce, its export subsidies.102
At the multilateral level, they brought several complaints before
GATT, contending that the EEC had used its export subsidies to dis-
place traditional wheat exporters in third country markets, thereby
capturing an "inequitable share" of world trade in violation of Section
10.2 of the Subsidies Code.103 Neither approach curbed EEC export
subsidies to an appreciable degree, or lessened the growing friction be-
tween the United States and the EEC on agricultural trade issues.
Eventually, the United States responded to EEC agricultural ex-
port subsidies in kind through the adoption of the Export Enhance-
ment Program (EEP) provisions of the 1985 Farm Billlo4. This
massive export subsidy program' 05 was designed to meet the short-
term policy objective of enabling U.S. agricultural exporters to com-
pete with subsidized EEC exporters in world markets, and the longer
term objective of forcing the EEC to enter into serious negotiations to
100. For example, the ten current members of the EEC were net importers of over 21
million metric tons of wheat and coarse grains in 1960-61. That figure fell to 11.54
million tons in 1977-78, to 6.50 million tons in 1978-79 and 2.65 million tons in
1979-80. By 1985-86, they were net exporters of 17.13 million tons. HATHAWAY,
supra note 49, at 10.
101. Bentil, supra note 95, at 360.
102. Boger, supra note 97, at 229-30.
103. Id. at 208-14.
104. 7 U.S.C. § 1736(v)(1985)(repealed Nov. 28, 1990).
105. From May 1985 through February 1989, the USDA awarded 71 U.S. agricultural
exporters EEP bonuses worth $2.3 billion. A year later, that total had grown to
$2.7 billion. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXPORT ENANCEMENT PROGRAM'S
RECENT CHANGES AND FUTURE ROLE 8, 9 GAO/NSIAD-90-204 (June 1990).
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liberalize its agricultural trade policies.106 From 1985 to the present,
Congress's package of assistance to U.S. agricultural interests that
compete with subsidized EEC exporters expanded to include: addi-
tional funding for the EEP, an expansion of the number of eligible
export markets, the establishment of the Targeted Export Assistance
(TEA) program's matching grants for promotional campaigns, and
generous funding for existing CCC loan guarantee programs.107
Although there is a question as to who fired the first shot, the
United States and the EEC have been engaged in a full-fledged agri-
cultural trade war for at least the past six years. The arsenal of each
trading partner includes measures to insulate all or part of its domes-
tic market from import competition (primarily U.S. quotas and EEC
variable levies) and export subsidies to assist exporters to penetrate
foreign markets by selling at less than their cost of production.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN GATT'S
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND FOOD SECURITY
CONCERNS
Taxpayers and/or consumers always pay a price when their nations
adopt trade-distorting policies. Sometimes the price may be consid-
ered an investment-for example, when an industry is insulated from
import competition during its infancy, but thereafter becomes an un-
protected efficient competitor in world markets. In other situations,
taxpayers and consumers may be willing to pay the price of protec-
tionism on a long-term basis because non-economic objectives out-
weigh those costs. And, in some cases, taxpayers and consumers may
pay the price of protectionism simply because they are unaware of its
consequences or lack the political power to change those policies.
The first step in resolving the apparently intractable dispute be-
tween GATT's basic economic efficiency objective and the food secur-
ity objectives of many nations is to analyze the policy issues relating to
each of those objectives.
A. Economic Efficiency Objectives
The extent to which current agricultural trade policies deviate
from usual GATT economic efficiency objectives and distort natural
trade flows can be measured in a number of ways. A non-exhaustive
review of recent articles by trade economists includes estimates and
forecasts of the cost of import restrictions on a product by product
basis, aggregate costs of consumer and taxpayer transfers to farmers,
distortions in natural trade flows, and net welfare losses.
106. Id.
107. 7 U.S.C. § 1736(s)(1985).
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1. Extent of Protection for Specific Products
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) recently prepared
two reports to the President on the degree of protection extended to a
number of foreign and domestic agricultural products.10s In both
studies, the ITC staff employed a tariff equivalent methodology to
measure the levels of protection provided by major agricultural ex-
porting nations, that is, it calculated the tariff rate that would have the
same effect as the protection presently extended through quotas and
other non-tariff measures. 109
As noted in Appendix Table A, which is reproduced from the ITC
study, ad valorem tariffs generally ranging from about 50 to 200 per-
cent would be required to provide the same degree of protection as
was provided in 1988 by U.S. Section 22 import quotas on sugar, dairy
products and peanuts. Relatively modest tariffs-in the approximate
range of zero to seven percent-would compensate for an elimination
of import quotas on beef and cotton. 110
The EEC extends even greater levels of protection to a number of
products that were included in the ITC study. As noted in Appendix
Table B, it concluded that on products like cheddar cheese, nonfat dry
milk and sugar, import tariffs ranging from 166 to 182 percent would
provide a level of protection that is equivalent to current CAP farm
programs."'
According to the ITC, however, Japanese farm programs provide
the highest levels of protection to domestic farmers. As noted in Ap-
pendix Table B, the ITC concluded that Japanese producers of sugar,
butter and rice are the beneficiaries of quotas that could be converted
to tariff equivalents of 360, 507 and 700 percent respectively." 2
Certainly, these levels of protection are not representative of agri-
cultural nations' farm programs as a whole, or of the levels of protec-
tion extended by the United States, EEC or Japan to their farmers as a
whole. These data, however, illustrate the extent to which current
farm programs can distort the price of particular farm products in do-
mestic markets, and reflect the political power of specific agricultural
108. UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE Comi'N, Estimated Tariff Equivalents of U.S. Quo-
tas on Agricultural Imports and Analysis of Competitive Conditions in U.S. and
Foreign Markets for Sugar, Meat, Peanuts, Cotton and Dairy Products (USITC
Publication 2276, Apr. 1990)[hereinafter U.S. Tariff Equivalents]; UNrrED STATES
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, Estimated Tariff Equivalents of Nontariff Barriers on Cer-
tain Agricultural Imports in the European Community, Japan, and Canada
(USITC Publication 2280, Apr. 1990)[hereinafter Foreign Tariff Equivalents].
109. U.S. Tariff Equivalents, supra note 108, at 1-1 to 1-9; Foreign Tariff Equivalents,
supra note 108, at vi.
110. U.S. Tariff Equivalents, supra note 108, at xvi.
111. Foreign Tariff Equivalents, supra note 108, at vi.
112. Id.
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interests that will have an interest in maintaining current farm
programs.
2. Costs to Taxpayers and Consumers
The costs of trade-distorting agricultural policies can be borne by
domestic taxpayers or consumers (or both). Taxpayers bear the cost
when their governments use tax revenues to provide income support
to eligible farmers-whether they are domestic income support pro-
grams, such as nonrecourse loans or deficiency payments, or export
subsidies. Consumers bear the cost when import quotas or other im-
port restrictions reduce available supplies and force them to buy prod-
ucts at prices that exceed the world market price.
The annual Monitoring and Outlook Reports of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) provide esti-
mates of the total annual costs incurred by the major trading nations'
taxpayers and consumers in maintaining their agricultural policies.
The estimated costs of those transfers by the eleven major industrial-
ized members of the OECD are reproduced in Appendix Table C.
As noted in Table C, consumers and taxpayers in Japan, the United
States and the EEC transferred $57.8 billion, $67.2 billion and $97.5
billion to their farmers, respectively, pursuant to their countries' 1989
farm support programs.11 3 Taxpayers and consumers in the United
States and the EEC alone spent over $668 billion during four years of
their agricultural trade war to maintain current agricultural policies.
The OECD estimated the total costs of transfers from taxpayers and
consumers to farmers in eleven OECD nations at: $272.2 billion in
1986; $290.4 billion in 1987; $289.4 billion in 1988 and $251.1 billion in
1989.-14
Not all of these expenditures would be considered trade-distorting
in the usual sense of the term. For example, the OECD includes gov-
ernment expenditures for agricultural research, training and exten-
sion services, food inspections and disease control programs in its
calculation of transfers from taxpayers to farmers. Although these
programs may promote domestic agricultural interests in a general
way, few trade negotiators would argue that they distort trade signifi-
cantly or should be prohibited by GATT.
Recognizing that some agricultural programs would easily pass
muster under GATT's basic principles, trade negotiators and econo-
mists have used the ballpark figure of $200 billion to estimate the cur-
113. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEvELoPMENT, AGRIcULTURAL
POLICIES, MARKETS AND TRADE: MONITORING AND OUTLOOK 1989, at 80-81 (1989);
ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNoMIc COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURAL
POLIcIEs, MARKETS AND TRADE: MONITORING AND OUTLOOK 1990, at 111-13
(1990).
114. Id.
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rent annual cost of the major trading nations trade-distorting
agricultural policies.115 Viewed from another perspective this approx-
imate figure of $200 billion per year is the potential "peace dividend"
that taxpayers and consumers in developed nations could obtain by
negotiating an end to the current agricultural trade war.
3. Distortions in Trade Flows
Another way to measure the magnitude of current agricultural pol-
icies is to estimate the distortive effects of current farm programs by
comparing current trade flows to the trade flows that would be ex-
pected if the trade-distorting aspects of current programs were elimi-
nated. Static estimates of transfers from taxpayers and consumers to
farmers help to identify the costs of present agricultural policies, but
do not tell us how consumer and taxpayer costs and farm incomes
would change if trade-distorting measures were eliminated. Fortu-
nately, general equilibrium economic models have been developed to
forecast the impact of agricultural trade liberalization-which pre-
sumably would produce natural trade flows by eliminating the trade-
distorting effects of current farm programs.
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
recently developed one of the more ambitious general equilibrium
econometric models. 116 Its model, the Basic Linked System (BLS),
links sophisticated models for eighteen individual countries and two
economic communities (the EEC and the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance) and fourteen simplified models for other groups of
countries.1- 7
HASA assumed that the nations liberalizing their agricultural
trade policies would eliminate all trade-distorting measures immedi-
ately-an assumption that seems to have been picked to simplify the
model, rather than to reflect the probable implementation of any
agreement to liberalize agricultural trade. Using these assumptions, it
then applied the model to several possible scenarios, including two
that roughly correspond to the primary options available to the con-
tracting parties concerning the coverage of any Uruguay Round agri-
cultural trade liberalization agreement: (a) its mandatory application
to developed nations, but optional application to LDCs; and (b) its
mandatory application to all contracting parties.
115. See, e.g., Clayton K Yeutter, U.S. Negotiating Proposal on Agriculture in the
Uruguay Round, THE NEw GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, 265 (1988); ORGAZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENr, AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING
NATIONS 479 (1990).
116. The IIASA's ran a number of scenarios through its econometric model and pub-
lished the results in PARITH, supra note 95.
117. Id. at 29-32.
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a. Forecasted Changes under OECD Trade Liberalization
IIASA first forecasted the changes in production, trade and wel-
fare benefits that would occur if only OECD nations eliminated trade-
distorting agricultural policies. That scenario roughly corresponds to
the situation that would occur if all contracting parties, with the ex-
ception of LDCs, were required by GATT to eliminate all trade-dis-
torting aspects of their farm programs.
As noted in Appendix Table D, the BLS model predicts that world-
wide agricultural production under the OECD trade liberalization sce-
nario would increase only modestly, as compared to projected
production for the same period without liberalization (the reference
run). Changes in production levels range from a negative 1.5 percent
for non-food agriculture to an increase of 3.3 percent for bovine and
ovine products (primarily beef) in the year 2000. Even though prices
would decrease significantly in nations providing high levels of protec-
tion to their farmers, domestic consumption would increase only
slightly because the demand for food is relatively inelastic. In particu-
lar, people in developed nations usually do not increase their total
food consumption significantly when food prices decline.1S
Although the IIASA's model predicts modest growth in worldwide
production, it forecasts a substantial increase in agricultural trade-
i.e., an increase in the share of food that is produced in nations en-
joying comparative advantages and exported to nations with compara-
tive disadvantages, and a decrease in the share of food produced and
consumed within domestic economies subject to comparative advan-
tages. For example, as indicated in Appendix Table D, by the year
2000, IIASA forecasts that trade in rice and beef would increase by
37.4 and 34.9 percent respectively under its trade liberalization
scenario.
The model also indicates that national trade patterns would shift
significantly. In general, the IIASA model predicts that OECD na-
tions with highly protected domestic agricultural economies would
substantially increase their imports of agricultural products, and na-
tions with relatively low levels of protection would substantially in-
crease their exports. As noted in Appendix Table E below, many of
these shifts in trade patterns would be dramatic-and catastrophic
from the viewpoint of highly protected domestic agricultural interests.
For example, Japanese rice imports would be almost twenty-five times
higher than current levels, and EEC wheat exports would plummet by
98 percent. Of course, these losses would be offset by other nations'
gains. Several nations would increase their dairy exports significantly
(Austria by 235 percent and Argentina by 507 percent). The model
forecasts the United States as a relatively clear winner in this regard.
118. Id. at 94-96.
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For example, it forecasts respectable increases in wheat and coarse
grain exports (nineteen and twelve percent respectively), with by far
the largest absolute volume increases for these commodities (36.8 mil-
lion and 82.0 million bushels, respectively)" 9 of any of the trading
partners included in the model.
As noted previously, many of the major agricultural countries
heavily subsidize the cost of domestically produced agricultural prod-
ucts. Some of the domestic subsidies (e.g., taxpayer-financed farm in-
come programs) and all of the export subsidies tend to reduce the
world price of agricultural products. Under its trade liberalization
scenario, IIASA estimates that the world price of agricultural prod-
ucts would rise by about ten percent in comparison to nonagricultural
prices.12 0
Agricultural prices would decrease in nations that eliminate exten-
sive restrictions against imports. Although world market prices for
agriculture would increase, they would still be less than the domestic
prices currently paid to many farmers who are protected from import
competition by substantial restrictions on imports.'21
The model also predicts that significant changes in farm income
would occur. In general, farm income would increase in nations that
currently provide relatively modest levels of protection to their farm-
ers, and decrease in nations that provide extensive protection. Mea-
sured on a parity basis (the relationship between domestic farm and
non-farm per capita income), farm income would increase by twenty-
nine percent in New Zealand, twelve percent in Australia and Canada
and seven percent in Austria; it would decrease by thirty-five percent
in Japan, four percent in the EEC and two percent in the United
States. 22
Finally, the model suggests that the World Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) would increase by a relatively small percentage, but by a rela-
tively large absolute amount. On a global scale, the IASA model
predicts a 0.22 percent increase in aggregate Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). Although that is a small percentage factor, in 1980 dollars it
amounts to about $50 billion (compared, for example, to total OECD
nations' development assistance of $27 billion in that year). 2 3
b. Forecasted Changes under OECD and LDC Liberalization
IIASA also ran the assumption of trade liberalization by both the
OECD and LDCs in its model. Consistent with its first run under the
OECD liberalization scenario, IIASA predicted that the OECD coun-
119. Id. at 102, 103 (Table 5.10).
120. Id. at 131.
121. Id. at 122, 132.
122. Id. at 129 (Table 5.29).
123. Id. at 119, 132.
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tries would realize the bulk of the benefits to be obtained from agri-
cultural trade liberalization. But IASA concluded that if the OECD
countries liberalized their agricultural trade, the LDCs would be bet-
ter off by liberalizing as well, rather than by exercising an option to
retain trade-distorting policies1 2 4
4. Net Welfare Benefits
The IIASA model also predicted that the impact of agricultural
trade liberalization under either scenario (liberalization by all nations
or solely by developed nations) on net welfare benefits to the country
as a whole would be quite different for developed and undeveloped
countries.
a. Developed Countries
In general, the IIASA predicts a net welfare gain for most OECD
countries under any agricultural trade liberalization scenario, but it
predicts a substantial decline in income parity for Japanese and EEC
farmers. Those losses of income, however, are less than the costs of
the current agricultural policies to their nations' consumers and tax-
payers. Accordingly, even Japan and the EEC could maintain farm
income at current levels, while reducing taxpayer and consumer ex-
penditures by substituting decoupled farm subsidies for current agri-
cultural programs.125
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reached the same
conclusion in its analysis of agricultural trade policy reforms. 26 It
concluded that, on average, for every dollar that a farmer in an indus-
trialized country gains through protectionist policies, consumers and
taxpayers in that country lose $1.42. Taxpayers and consumers in the
United States, EEC and Japan pay $1.38, $1.45 and $1.48, respectively,
to transfer $1.00 to their farmers.2 7 The USDA concludes that this
excess cost to taxpayers and consumers, as compared to benefits re-
ceived by farmers, is caused by inefficient uses of resources that are
encouraged by current farm programs.
The inefficient use of resources attributed to current farm pro-
grams can be measured in other ways. For example, Clyde Prestowitz
notes that: "Protection of some of the world's highest-cost agriculture
has resulted in half of Japan's scarce (non-mountainous) land being
reserved for rice growing, while the 94 percent of Japanese who are
124. Id. at 232.
125. Id. at 132.
126. VERNON 0. RONNINGEN AND PRAVEEN M. DxIlT, How LEVEL IS THE PLAYING
FIELD? (USDA Economic Research Service Foreign Agricultural Economic Re-
port No. 239; Dec. 1989).
127. Id. at 25.
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not farmers make do on the other half."' 12 As a result, a typical two
bedroom condominium, an hour and a half from Tokyo by train, costs
nearly $600,000. To buy it, the Japanese couple typically puts 30 per-
cent down, assumes a mortgage of six to ten times their annual income
and depends upon their children to complete their mortgage pay-
ments.1 9 In Prestowitz's words: "The fact is that while Japan is rich,
the Japanese are not."13 0
b. Less Developed Countries
Under current agricultural policies, the EEC, the United States
and other developed countries depress the world price of food by pay-
ing subsidies to their agricultural producers. The elimination of those
subsidies is the main reason the IASA model forecasts a ten percent
increase in world prices with agricultural trade liberalization. If the
world price of food increases, net importers among the LDCs will have
to use more of their scarce foreign reserves to purchase food for their
population-raising the distinct possibility that already hungry popu-
lations would be able to buy even less food.
c. Summary of Economic Efficiency Objectives
A fairly convincing body of economic literature indicates that the
distortion of natural agricultural trade flows is extremely costly, and
counterproductive to the international economy as a whole. Stated
conversely, an impressive school of economic theory indicates that the
elimination of current trade-distorting farm programs would produce
net welfare benefits of sufficient magnitude that it would be possible
to reduce consumer and taxpayer costs, while maintaining current
farm incomes through decoupled farm income support programs.
Other economists may quibble with the econometric models used in
those studies, or vehemently reject their overall conclusions. None-
theless, it appears that if economic efficiency were the only objective
of agricultural trade policy, the negotiators at the Uruguay Round
would have reached agreement on an agricultural trade reform pack-
age in relatively short order.
B. Food Security Objectives
While few dispute the macro-economic benefits of trade liberaliza-
tion, national trade policies and international trade agreements are
not, and never have been, based solely on economic considerations.
The history of sacrificing economic efficiency to achieve non-economic
128. CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, TRADiNG PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE
THE LEAD 312 (1988).
129. Id. at 311.
130. Id.
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objectives is as old as economics itself.13 1 Even Adam Smith, the
founding father of laissez-faire economics, observed that, "Defense is
of much more importance than opulence."132 Similarly, in referring
more directly to trade policy, John Stuart Mill wrote: "Economic wel-
fare is not the sole goal of life. Political considerations are also impor-
tant. Thus, it may be necessary to become partially self-sufficient in
certain types of activity, even at great cost because of fear of future
wars."
133
Reflecting Mill's comments on the interplay of economic and polit-
ical objectives, an OECD report on agricultural trade policies
concluded:
A reliable supply of food and feedstuffs is perhaps the most important policy
in all OECD countries and domestic agriculture is expected to make a substan-
tial contribution towards this goal. In particular, countries with relatively low
levels of self-sufficiency in food and feed production often take measures to
maintain a certain level of farm production, some of them even at a relatively
high cost.1 3 4
1. War Time Disruptions to Food Supply
The concerns articulated by Smith and Mill are reflected, to a
greater or lesser degree, in the trade policies of virtually all nations,
and are supported by logic and history. 3 5 During this century, the
flow of food imports to the civilian populations of belligerent countries
has been curtailed in virtually every major conflict.
Many disruptions to the food supply, moreover, have been deliber-
ate rather than unintended byproducts of war. Acting upon their
analysis of food supply as "the weakest link in Britain's chain of de-
fense," German military planners in World War I directed their sub-
marine fleet against allied North Atlantic shipments to defeat
England by starvation.136 Complaints about wartime shortages of food
in Britain soon evolved into demands for the adoption of food security
policies to guard against future wartime shortages.137
131. Gary R. Saxonhouse, The National Security Clause of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962: Import Competition and the Machine Tool Industry, in LAW AND TRADE
ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 218 (1986).
132. Adam Smith as quoted in Charles P. Kindleberger, INT'L EcON. 116 (1968) and
Saxonhouse, supra note 131, at 218.
133. John Stuart Mill as quoted in Paul Anthony Samuelson, ECON. 626 (1980) and
Saxonhouse, supra note 131, at 218.
134. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PROBLEMS OF
AGRICULTURAL TRADE 90 (1982).
135. Among the major countries most actively involved in current agricultural trade
negotiations, the United States is one of the few that would be virtually immune
from food security problems during my foreseeable crisis.
136. M. OLSON, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WARTIME SHORTAGE: A HISTORY OF BRITISH
FOOD SUPPLIES IN THE NAPOLEONIC WAR AND IN WORLD WAR I AND II 6 (1963).
137. Id.
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Of course, Great Britain (joined by the United States after it en-
tered the world wars) used its own blockade to curtail the flow of im-
ported food to Germany's civilian population. The blockade was
especially effective in World War I. An estimated 769,000 German ci-
vilians perished as a result of the meager rations available to them,138
leading many German and British authorities alike to conclude that
without the blockade, the allies would not have won the war.1 3 9
European food shortages did not end with the cessation of hostili-
ties. Even with the stockpiles of food that were accumulated shortly
after the end of World War II, the allied governments feared famine in
the winter of 1945-46. Food shortages were not overcome for another
three years.140
Japan's experience during World War II provides even more
graphic evidence of the vulnerability of countries that are not self-suf-
ficient in the production of food during wartime. Before Pearl Har-
bor, Japan was able to maintain a food supply that was adequate by
Asian standards for the time (an average per capita caloric intake of
2,000 calories per person per day), but modest by Western standards
(the comparable U.S. average was 3,400 calories per day).141 Its pro-
duction was obtained through intensive cultivation of the limited ara-
ble land and extensive fishing operations. As the war progressed, the
allies used their naval superiority to restrict the fishing grounds avail-
able to Japan's fleets, and to interdict the shipments of food and the
petroleum and fertilizer required to obtain high crop yields. Despite
the rationing programs that began in 1941, the food situation soon be-
came critical. Average per capita caloric intake declined to about 1,680
calories by the end of the war. Since military personnel, coal miners
and heavy industrial workers needed more than average rations in or-
der to do their work, the remainder of the civilian population received
less than the per capita average.142
In surveys conducted shortly after the war ended, sixty-four per-
cent of Japanese respondents stated that they had reached the point
prior to surrender where they personally felt they were unable to go
on with the war effort. Relatively few attributed their opinions to
Japanese military defeats, including the fall of Saipan. Instead, those
surveys indicated that cuts in food rations, along with air attacks on
Japanese cities, devastated morale.143
138. The average daily ration by the fall of 1916 contained only 1,344 calories. Id. at 79.
139. Id. at 80.
140. Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike and the Disappearing Atrocities, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24,
1991, at 1, 36, col. 1 (book review).
141. THE UNnED STATES STRATEGIc BOMBING SURVEYs 93 (1946), reprinted by Air
University Press (1987).
142. Id. at 93-94.
143. Id. at 95.
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2. Peacetime Disruptions to Food Supply
Economic and political power, as well as military power, can be a
potent force for disrupting food imports. The United States, for exam-
ple, has participated in a number of embargoes over the past two de-
cades that have disrupted trade in agricultural products.
In some circumstances, trade embargoes have been employed as
close substitutes for the use of military force in an attempt to achieve
military objectives. For approximately six months before the United
States and its allies' armed forces eventually drove Iraq out of Kuwait,
they relied upon an extensive United Nations embargo against trade
with Iraq to accomplish their objectives.144 Recognizing the strategic
vulnerability resulting from Iraq's dependence on food imports for a
substantial portion of its requirements, the embargo applies to Iraq's
food imports other than UN-supervised shipments for humanitarian
purposes. 45 Other instances in which trade embargoes have been
used as an alternative to military force include UN-sponsored embar-
goes of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa, and the
United States unilateral embargoes against Cuba and Nicaragua. The
United States singled out food as a trade weapon when it embargoed
U.S. grain exports to the Soviet Union in retaliation for its invasion of
Afghanistan.
In other circumstances, nations have curtailed agricultural exports
for purely economic reasons. For example, in 1973 President Nixon
responded to a petition by U.S. food processors by briefly banning the
export of soybeans.146 The President granted the requested relief to
promote domestic objectives-to prevent the inflationary pressures
that the processors predicted would result from an expected shortage
of domestic supply. But, the international impact of his decision was
to remind foreign purchasers who had begun to rely upon U.S. ex-
ports-primarily the Japanese-that food imports can be disrupted for
economic, as well as military, motives.
3. Cumulative Impact of Trade Disruptions in Japan
Japan provides a good case study of the cumulative impact of mili-
tary and economic disruptions to food imports on the way that nations
assess the objective of maintaining minimum levels of agricultural
self-sufficiency.
Despite its wartime experience, the Japanese Government steadily
lowered barriers to trade in agricultural products, and reduced its
144. U.N. Security Council Resol. Nos. 661 (8/6/90), 665 (8/25/90), 666 (9/13/90), U.N.
DPI/11074 (Nov. 1990).
145. Id. (especially Resol. 666(6)).
146. Komiya & Itoh, supra note 84, at 211.
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level of agricultural self-sufficiency for almost thirty years. But, as
noted by Japanese commentators:
[The year 1973 was the turning point in the history of Japan's agricultural
protection policy. Until then, a majority of Japanese did not feel uneasy about
depending on imported food supplies. This was one factor behind Japan's
sharply increasing dependence of imported food throughout the 1960s .... In
1973, a series of events, including the oil crisis, sharp worldwide rises in food
prices, and the U.S. embargo of soybean exports to Japan, shook the so-far
complacent Japanese. Suddenly they came to realize the vulnerability of the
Japanese economy to external shocks and began to think that a further in-
crease in the degree of dependence on food and energy imports would be un-
safe and undesirable. This change in attitudes strengthened the political basis
of agricultural protectionism.' 47
Clyde Prestowitz, an American who has studied Japan as a college
student, business executive and trade official since 1960, provides a
non-Japanese viewpoint on their deep-seated commitment to self-suf-
ficiency in his book Trading Places:
[T]he Japanese lay great stress on self-sufficiency-and do so all the more pre-
cisely because Japan knows it cannot be self-sufficient. Most Japanese reiter-
ate the theme that their country is a small island nation with no natural
resources in order to rationalize and justify its efforts to the dependent on
nothing beyond natural resources simply not available in Japan. For example,
during a hiking vacation in the mountains of Japan, I came across a govern-
ment-run farm which provided grazing for cattle trucked in by farmers for the
summer months. During the rest of the year, the cattle remained indoors or
cooped up in small spaces. With its lack of open space, Japan is far from a
paradise for cattle raising. Nevertheless, as a result of the efforts of the Minis-
try of Agriculture, Japan is supplying 70 percent of its own beef.
Another time, several years ago, I was negotiating on behalf of a chemical
manufacturer who wished to enter the Japanese market. Eventually every
discussion came down to the point of whether my client was willing to main-
tain a one-year inventory in Japan .... Thus, the very people who expect
Americans and others to be content to depend on a flow of goods from a Japa-
nese supplier ten thousand miles away, insist on domestic production and the
maintenance of large local inventories. The Japanese see nothing strange in
this dichotomy;, they know Japanese can be relied upon, but they are not so
sure of foreigners.148
As important as food security objectives have been to the Japanese
since World War II, advocates of agricultural protectionism have not
had a free hand in shaping Japanese trade policy during the post-war
era. Instead, those objectives have been balanced against competing
economic objectives.
For the most part, the source of the competing economic objectives
in Japan has not been consumer demands for access to lower-priced
imports. A survey conducted for the Prime Minister in 1987, for ex-
ample, reported that sixty-seven percent of Japanese white collar
147. Id.
148. PRasrowrrz, supra note 128, at 93-94.
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workers supported the government's food security programs.149 In-
stead, the primary source of opposition has been relentless pressure
from its major trade partners, and a pragmatic realization that Japan
could not continue indefinitely to sell its manufactured products in
relatively open foreign markets while closing its agricultural market
to foreign competition.
In the face of overwhelming pressure from its trading partners,
therefore, Japan slowly and grudgingly has become more dependent
upon foreign sources of food. In 1960, domestic sources accounted for
ninety percent of its total food consumption. That measure of agricul-
tural self-sufficiency dropped significantly to seventy-eight percent by
1970. Despite the increased demands for protectionism after 1973, Ja-
pan's agricultural self-sufficiency ratio continued to decline (albeit at a
lower rate) throughout the next decade, and reached the seventy-two
percent level by 1980.150 In 1990, a Japanese government spokesman
indicated that the self-sufficiency rate of the Japanese people on a ca-
loric basis was only forty-nine percent-the lowest of any industrial-
ized nation.151 That self-sufficiency ratio will fall even further over
the next several years as its beef and citrus quotas are liberalized and
then removed.
Although Japan slowly dismantled many of its barriers to agricul-
tural imports over the past thirty years, and has promised to phase out
most of the remaining barriers over the next several years, it has
drawn the line on rice imports. Due to the historic role of rice in Ja-
pan as the basic and essential source of food, the Japanese Govern-
ment imposes a complete ban on imports of rice, with the exception of
a small amount of a specialized type of rice used in the manufacture of
sake that is not grown in Japan.152 Until recently, this sentiment was
so strong that U.S. trade negotiators acknowledged that rice remained
"sacred territory" in Japan, beyond the scope of any possible negotia-
tions-despite the demands of the U.S. industry to open the Japanese
market to lower priced imports. 5 3
In the event of a war or other crisis that would cut off imported
food supplies, at current levels of self-sufficiency Japan would be hard
pressed to maintain minimal nutrition levels for its population. If Ja-
pan's level of self-sufficiency decreases as is expected and particularly
if its rice fields have been paved over to construct housing and VCR
factories, mass starvation could occur during a prolonged conflict.
149. JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, supra note 80, at 325.
150. Michael R. Reich et al., Agriculture, the Political Economy of Structural Change,
in AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN, 57, 158 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1986).
151. 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 555-56 (Apr. 18, 1990).
152. For a good summary of Japan's rice marketing control system, see ORGANISATION
OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL POLICIES AND AGRI-
CULTURAL TRADE: COUNTRY STUDY, JAPAN 35-41 (1987).
153. Reich, supra note 150, at 191.
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Under those circumstances, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
maintain a war effort.
Japan presents the starkest example of the vulnerability that
would occur if a developed country exploited its comparative advan-
tage in the production of manufactured products to the extent that it
did not maintain minimal levels of self-sufficiency in domestic food
production. Although the economic benefits to be gained by bringing
agricultural trade within GATT's mainstream may be enormous, few
nations will gamble on their ability to survive during a crisis situation
in order to maximize their standards of living.
4. Structural Vulnerability of LDCs
For many LDCs, the vulnerability resulting from a failure to main-
tain minimal levels of agricultural self-sufficiency is structural and
persistent, rather than the product of an occasional crisis. The dimen-
sions of this vulnerability can be viewed from several different
perspectives.
An analysis of LDC food security concerns should begin with a rec-
ognition that those countries are subject to all of the forces that cause
developed countries to enact farm programs to insure minimal levels
of agricultural self-sufficiency. The primary difference between de-
veloped country and LDC vulnerabilities is a matter of degree. LDCs
have been involved in more than their share of armed conflicts since
World War II; they tend to have less military capability than devel-
oped countries to protect their supply lines from interdiction; and they
tend to have less bargaining power than developed countries to main-
tain foreign sources of supply in the event of shortages or other eco-
nomic crises. In addition, LDCs must respond to food security
concerns that have no counterpart in developed countries.
We can quantify some of the potential costs of LDC dependence on
foreign sources of food by considering the reverse side of the potential
savings that developed countries would realize by eliminating their ag-
ricultural subsidies. As noted previously, developed countries could
save approximately $200 billion per year by eliminating trade-dis-
torting subsidies; but much of the developed countries' savings would
occur at the LDCs' expense. World market prices would have to in-
crease if farmers in developed countries are to cover their full unsub-
sidized costs (the IASA model projects a ten percent increase).154
LDCs having difficulty in purchasing enough imported food to make
up for shortfalls in domestic production at current world price levels,
would be hard pressed to maintain those imports at substantially
higher prices.
Economic studies have attempted to quantify the effect of higher
154. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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agricultural prices on world hunger. As noted in Appendix Table F, a
1980 World Bank study predicted that as many as 913 million addi-
tional people in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa slip
beneath the minimum caloric intake levels recommended by the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization
(WHO) when food prices increase by one percent per year (in constant
dollars).
No known economic model forecasts the additional number of peo-
ple in LDCs that would slip beneath Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion/World Health Organization recommended minimum nutrition
levels as a result of the elimination of existing agricultural subsidies
under specific trade liberalization scenarios. Conceivably trade liber-
alization could trigger spurts of LDC growth rates of sufficient magni-
tude to overcome or at least blunt the effects of rising food prices on
hunger in LDCs. Despite the lack of precise quantification, however,
the data and common sense quite clearly highlight the danger that in-
creases in world food prices brought about by agricultural trade liber-
alization could threaten the lives and health of millions of people in
the third world.
5. Summary
In simple terms, the costs associated with removing agricultural
trade from GATT's basic economic efficiency objectives are immense.
However, the risks that many countries would incur if they cannot
satisfy legitimate food security concerns are incalculable.
V. PROPOSALS FOR BALANCING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
AND FOOD SECURITY OBJECTIVES
The inherent nature of international trade disputes often pre-
cludes the recommendation of a single, universal solution to complex
problems. As a practical matter, political realities (including percep-
tions or even misperceptions of national interests) may mean that the
best conceptual solutions are not viable alternatives. In these in-
stances, less ambitious alternatives may be the most that is attainable
in the short or long term. Moreover, solutions that are appropriate for
trade among developed nations may be inappropriate for trade involv-
ing LDCs.
A. Best Solution for Trade among Developed Countries
A basic premise of this article is the generally accepted view that
GATT has worked reasonably well in accommodating the contracting
parties' essential economic and non-economic objectives over the past
four decades, as they steadily increased the volume of their trade in
manufactured products. Indeed, without a satisfactory mechanism for
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balancing those objectives, GATT would not have survived its inauspi-
cious beginning and the lack of a true international institution to en-
force its rules.
Somewhat surprisingly, this record of successfully accommodating
economic and non-economic objectives within the framework of
GATT's mainstream rules seems to have been largely overlooked by
both the proponents of economic efficiency-driven agricultural trade
rules and those who insist that nations must remain free to adopt
trade restrictions as necessary to insure food security. The logical first
step in the search for a resolution of the seemingly intractable conflict
between economic efficiency and food security objectives in the agri-
cultural trade sector is a critical review of GATT rules and practices
that have facilitated the accommodation of economic efficiency princi-
ples and conflicting non-economic objectives in sectors of trade subject
to GATT's mainstream provisions.
1. Extension of GATT's Basic Economic Effsciency Provisions to
Agricultural Trade
By most accounts, GATT has worked reasonably well in increasing
trading partners' standards of living by allowing nations to exploit
their comparative advantages in sectors of trade covered by its main-
stream rules. To accord approximately the same level of assurance to
nations enjoying comparative advantages in agriculture as those en-
joying comparative advantages in manufacturing industries, compara-
ble GATT rules on tariffs, import quotas and other non-tariff barriers
and subsidies must be extended to trade in agricultural products.
GATT's transparency principal establishes import tariffs as the ac-
cepted method of insulating domestic producers from full exposure to
the rigors of competition with foreign competitors. As the contracting
parties steadily reduced their tariffs over the course of seven previous
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, they significantly dimin-
ished the distortive impact of those restraints on the natural flows of
trade.
The first basic requirement for extending GATT's economic effi-
ciency objectives to agricultural trade is to equalize levels of transpar-
ent protection for domestic producers of agricultural and
manufactured products. Although the various proposals of the United
States, the Cairns Group and other proponents of agricultural trade
liberalization differ in detail,55 they all reflect the ultimate goal of
155. The United States' Uruguay Round proposals approach, but do not match, this
benchmark level of acceptable tariff protection. It originally proposed a total
elimination of tariffs on agricultural products (over a ten year phase-out period),
thereby suggesting less protection for farmers than manufacturers. Later, it pro-
posed a 75 percent reduction in the tariff equivalent of all forms of domestic pro-
tection over ten years, which probably would result in appreciably higher tariff
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extending approximate, if not equal, levels of tariff protection for
manufactured and agricultural products. Moreover, tariffs on agricul-
tural products must be bound to the same extent as tariffs on other
products subject to its trade discipline.
The converse of the transparency principal is the prohibition of im-
port quotas (or quantitative restrictions) to protect the domestic indus-
try. In order to achieve GATT's economic efficiency objectives, both
the original U.S. agricultural exceptions in Article XI.2(c) of the Gen-
eral Agreement, and the Section 22 waiver, must be eliminated.156
The third essential requirement for rewarding economic efficiency
within the framework of the existing GATT system would be to estab-
lish subsidy rules for agricultural products that are comparable to the
rules governing sectors of trade currently subject to its mainstream
trade discipline rules. When nations distort natural trade flows by as-
suming part of their producers' costs, they enable them to compete
through artificially low prices rather than inherent comparative
advantages.
One possible approach to extending GATT's mainstream economic
efficiency objectives to trade in agricultural products while maintain-
ing its consideration of competing non-economic objectives, focuses ex-
clusively on the text of the subsidy provisions in the General
Agreement and Subsidies Code. For legal technicians (but not neces-
sarily trade negotiators), it would be a relatively simple matter to
eliminate the primary product exceptions of Article XVI and the Sub-
sidies Code. Under this approach, Subsidies Code signatories would
resolve their subsidy disputes by distinguishing between prohibited
export subsidies and permissible domestic subsidies.1 57
Permissible domestic subsidies under Article 11 of the Subsidies
Code include subsidies that are used to promote social and economic
policies such as eliminating economic disadvantages in specific regions,
sustaining employment, encouraging worker retraining and rede-
ploying industry to avoid congestion and environmental problems.158
Signatories granting permissible domestic subsidies are required to
weigh the adverse effect of those subsidies, to the extent that is practi-
cable, on conditions of normal competition before granting the domes-
tic subsidy, and to consult with signatories that could be adversely
rates for agricultural imports than for manufactured imports. By the summer of
1992, the U.S. negotiators appeared willing to accept compromise proposals for
much lower decreases in subsidy levels. See section II.D. of this article.
156. The United States proposed to phase out agricultural import quotas by first con-
verting quotas and other forms of non-tariff protection to tariff equivalents, and
then eliminating those tariffs through negotiations conducted over a ten year pe-
riod. Id.
157. GATT? Subsidies Code, supra note 67.
158. Id. at Art. 11.1(a) and (c).
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affected by those measures. 159 Under the Subsidies Code, a signatory's
adoption of permissible domestic subsidies does not create any basis
for retaliation by other signatories that are adversely affected by those
measures.160
The issue of whether any aspect of a domestic farm program sub-
sidy unfairly distorts trade, however, cannot be resolved by attaching a
label of domestic or export subsidy to it. Natural trade flows are dis-
rupted by domestic loan guarantee systems that encourage production
in excess of domestic needs by guaranteeing farmers target prices
above world market levels. In either case, by coupling domestic farm-
ers' production of crops to the governmental benefits they receive, the
farm program, rather than natural comparative advantage, provides
the incentive to produce-whether the production occurs in the mar-
ginally productive fields of a generally efficient agricultural nation, or
in entire nations that lack the requisite soil, climate and other factors
of production. Moreover, a substantial portion of the annual $200 bil-
lion outlay for the major agricultural nations' domestic farm programs
are domestic subsidies that are granted to promote the type of worth-
while social goals set forth in Article 11 of the Subsidies Code.
Few Subsidy Code signatories abide by all of the requirements of
Article 11 in the sectors of trade that usually are governed relatively
effectively by GATT's mainstream provisions. As a general proposi-
tion, signatories that adopt domestic subsidy programs to promote the
economic and social goals enumerated by Article 11 show little evi-
dence of assigning much weight to the adverse effects of those pro-
grams on conditions of normal international competition. Signatories
whose own industries are injured by permissible domestic subsidies,
often retaliate by imposing countervailing duties.161 GATT is an
agreement that no contracting party is expected to observe to the let-
ter.162 Experience indicates that Article XVI and the Subsidies Code
would be even less capable of bringing an acceptable degree of trade
discipline to the agricultural sector than it has been for sectors of
trade that have been subject to its mainstream rules for the past forty-
five years.
Recognizing the limitations to the mere repeal of the primary
product exceptions to existing subsidy rules, the United States
159. Id. at Art. 11.2.
160. Id. at Art. 1.1.4.
161. In the United States, for example, foreign domestic subsidies that are established
to promote the objectives enumerated in Article 11 of the Subsidies Code are
countervailable if they are limited to specific industries. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5)(B)(1988).
162. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE Di'Lo-
MACY (1975) for a good historical review of the GATT legal system and the con-
trasting parties' expectations concerning acceptable records of compliance with
its rules.
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adopted a preferable approach in its Uruguay Round proposals. It
sought to eliminate all subsidies that distort natural trade flows,
whether labeled as export subsidies, border measures (ie., barriers to
imports) or domestic farm programs, while permitting nations to pro-
vide decoupled income support to farmers.
2. Reliance upon GATT's Existing Mechanisms for
Accommodating Non-economic Objectives
The General Agreement is also a good source of conceptual ap-
proaches that have been utilized to the reasonable satisfaction of the
contracting parties for over four decades to balance a wide variety of
non-economic objectives against the agreement's basic economic effi-
ciency objectives. Some of its articles contain generally applicable pro-
visions that would apply to trade in agricultural products if current
agricultural trade exceptions were repealed. Forty-five years of expe-
rience in applying GATT principles in GATT dispute resolution
panels and national tribunals also provides useful precedent that can
be employed to strike the proper balance between competing eco-
nomic efficiency and food security objectives.
a. GATT's Article XXI National Security Provisions
From the outset, the General Agreement has authorized con-
tracting parties to restrict imports on weapons and military supplies
and otherwise protect essential security interests. Article XXI pro-
vides that each contracting party is permitted to take any action
"which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential secur-
ity interests" relating to: the prevention of the disclosure of security
information, the regulation of traffic in fissionable materials or mili-
tary weapons or supplies, actions taken in time of war or other emer-
gency in international relations, and the fulfillment of its obligations
under the United Nations charter.163
On its face, this article does not seem to apply to the objective of
maintaining adequate domestic supplies of food to lessen the nation's
vulnerability in case of war. In practice, however, the combination of
the self-judging provisions of the article ("actions which the con-
tracting party considers necessary") and the catch-all category of
"other emergencies in international relations," perhaps supplemented
by the reality that treaty obligations usually give way to nations' per-
ceptions of their national security interests, has meant that the con-
tracting parties have deferred almost completely to the judgment of
the party invoking Article XXI.164
163. General Agreement, supra note 3, at Art. XXI (b),(c).
164. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 204-05.
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b. U.S. Implementation of Article XXI
The United States experience in the implementation and exercise
of the authority granted by Article XXI provides a useful preview of
how that authority might be used to balance economic efficiency and
food security objectives.
Congress first enacted implementing legislation in 1955, authoriz-
ing the Executive Branch to invoke national security-based trade re-
straints as exceptions to GATT's normal economic efficiency
objectives.165 Under the current law, Section 232 of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1932,166 the Secretary of Commerce is required to investi-
gate potential threats to national security caused by imports. The
criteria for exercising the power granted by Article XXI reflects the
self-judging character of that provision:
If the Secretary finds that such article is being imported into the United States
in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
national security, he shall so advise the President... [and] the President shall
take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the im-
ports of such article so that such imports will not threaten to impair the na-
tional security .... 167 In the administration of this section, the Secretary and
the President shall further recognize the close relation of the economic wel-
fare of the Nation to our national security, and shall take into consideration
the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual do-
mestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of
government, loss of skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting
from the displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports shall be
considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether such
weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security.1 6 8
Thus, Congress has taken full advantage of the considerable discre-
tion traditionally accorded to nations invoking the national security
clause. Most significantly, it has pushed the limits of Article XXI by
requiring the Executive Branch to consider the adverse economic ef-
fects of allowing imports to displace domestic products on national
security.
The Executive Branch has adopted a sophisticated methodology to
determine whether national security interests in a specific situation
outweigh economic efficiency objectives.16 9 Recent Section 232 inves-
tigations have turned on the ultimate issue of whether supplies of the
product in question would be sufficient to meet anticipated require-
ments during a national emergency.17 0 Although the relevant factors
165. Congress first granted such authority to the President in the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 86, § 7(b), 69 Stat. 166 (1958).
166. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1980 & Supp. H 1990).
167. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(Supp. II 1990).
168. Id. at § 1862(d).
169. See generally Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1964).
170. See, e.g., Presidential Decision, Uranium Section 232 National Security Investiga-
tion, 54 Fed. Reg. 47099 (1989)[hereinafter The Uranium Decision]; Presidential
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of a strategic supply analysis will vary from industry to industry, most
recent Section 232 decisions consider several factors.
The logical starting point for any strategic supply analyses is the
current state of the domestic industry that produces the article in
question, including domestic demand for the article, domestic supplies
and trends in the market.171
Probably the strategic analysts' most difficult responsibility in Sec-
tion 232 cases is to adopt reasonable assumptions on the duration,
scope and intensity of a future national security emergency. In recent
decisions, Executive Branch scenarios for emergencies have assumed
that normal trade flows would be interrupted from one to three years
as the consequence of a major conventional war. During that time
frame, the strategic analyst must also predict shipping losses, changes
in demand for the product, diversion from civilian to military con-
sumption and other relevant factors affecting supply and demand dur-
ing the emergency.172
The reliability of imports depends upon both the political reliabil-
ity of existing and potential new foreign suppliers and their geo-
graphic reliability in the context of forecasted emergency. For
example, in the Industrial Fastener Decision, the State Department
determined that all of our major foreign suppliers would be willing to
supply fasteners during an emergency. Under the forecasted emer-
gency scenario, however, predicted shipping losses on the North At-
lantic would render European suppliers geographically unreliable.
Thus, the strategic supply analysis in this case assumed that the
United States would have to rely upon imports from current sources
in geographically reliable Asia and Canada, and potential new sources
of supply in South America.173
Deliberately maintained stockpiles and unplanned excess inven-
tories of strategic products can provide a valuable hedge against emer-
Decision, Plastic Injection Molding Machines, Section 232 National Security Im-
port Investigation, 54 Fed. Reg. 13397 (1989)[hereinafter The Molding Machines
Decision]; Presidential Decision, Anti-Friction Bearing Section 232 National Se-
curity Import Investigation, 54 Fed. Reg. 1974-75 (1989)[hereinafter The Anti-
Friction Bearing Decision]; Presidential Decision, Petroleum Section 232 Na-
tional Security Import Investigation, 54 Fed. Reg. 6556 (1989)[hereinafter The
1989 Petroleum Decision]; Notice of Completion of Investigation of Bolts, Nuts
and Large Screws of Iron or Steel, 48 Fed. Reg. 8842 (1983)[hereinafter The Nuts
and Bolts Decision].
171. The Uranium Decision, supra note 170, at 47100; The Nuts and Bolts Decision,
supra note 170, at 8843-44.
172. See, e.g., The Molding Machines Decision, supra note 170, at 13398 (the national
security analysis assumed a one year mobilization period followed by one year of
a major conventional conflict); The 1989 Petroleum Decision, supra note 169, at
6558 (the national security analysis assumed a three year large scale conventional
conflict).
173. The Nuts and Bolts Decision, supra note 170, at 8845.
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gency shortfalls.174 In a short-lived national security emergency, they
could fill the entire gap left by a reduction in imports; in a longer
emergency, they may give the nation sufficient time to secure other
foreign sources of the product or expand domestic production.
Section 232 strategic supply analyses do not rely upon static esti-
mates of production by domestic sources. Just as analysts must con-
sider existing downward trends in domestic production, they should
determine whether the relevant industry could be revived, and domes-
tic production expanded if imports were cut off during the predicted
national emergency. 7 5
Although it is important to develop a reasonable methodology for
determining whether imports threaten national security, a contracting
party's record in granting or denying relief may provide a more relia-
ble test of whether Article XXI can be relied upon to strike an accept-
able balance between national security concerns and GATT's
economic efficiency objectives. In the United States, despite the broad
scope of Presidential authority to protect national security, the eight
Presidents who occupied the office since 1955 exercised the power
granted to them by Section 232 rather sparingly.176 Collectively, they
denied requests for import relief under Section 232 to petitioners rep-
resenting industries producing: flourspar (twice), cordage, stencil silk,
jewelled watches, clinical fever thermometers, analytical balances,
photograph shutters, pin lever clocks, watches and timers, wool tex-
tiles, wool felt, wooden boats, fine mesh wire cloth, dental burs, heavy
electric power equipment, cobalt, tungsten, steam turbine generators,
work knit gloves, surplus military rifles, transistors and related prod-
ucts, all textiles, industrial fasteners (nuts and bolts), anti-friction
bearings, plastic injection molding machines, and uranium. 77 To date,
Section 232 import relief has been provided only to the petroleum in-
dustry (on five different occasions), and the machine tool industry
(through a Voluntary Restraint Agreement with Japan and
Taiwan).' 7 8
c. Proposed Application of Article XXI to Legitimate Food
Security Objectives
Although all trade cases must be resolved on the basis of specific,
174. The Uranium decision, supra note 170, at 47099-100.
175. The Molding Machines Decision, supra note 170, at 13398.
176. A good history of Section 232 cases through 1986 is provided by David D. Knoll,
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Industrial Fasteners, Machine
Tools and Beyond, 10 MD. J. INTL. L. & TRADE 55 (1986).
177. Id. at 68. For § 232 investigations after 1986 see The Anti-Friction Bearing Deci-
sion, supra note 170, at 1974; The 1989 Petroleum Decision, supra note 170, at
6556; The Molding Machine Decision, supra note 170, at 13397; The Uranium De-
cision, supra note 170.
178. Knoll, supra note 176, at 68.
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concrete factual situations, the United States experience in Section
232 investigations suggests a number of basic principles that should be
considered by contracting parties in determining whether import re-
lief is justified by legitimate food security concerns, or by GATT dis-
pute resolution panels in considering disputes among contracting
parties. Some of the specific principles that should be applied to ad-
dress legitimate food security objectives are addressed next.
The first proposed principle is that contracting parties should not
be permitted to adopt food security-based import restraints that dis-
tort natural trade flows, unless they previously adopted reasonable
non-trade-distorting measures and can demonstrate that those meas-
ures were insufficient to protect their national security interests. As
recognized in recent U.S. Section 232 investigations, the output of the
domestic industry is but one factor in determining whether adequate
supplies would be available during a national security crisis. Some ad-
ditional factors, such as politically and geographically-reliable foreign
suppliers, must be factored into the strategic supply analysis, but prob-
ably cannot be affected very much by national policy. Other highly
effective non-trade-distorting means of protecting national security,
however, are available to nations with national security concerns.
Perhaps the best example of the interplay between trade-distorting
and non-trade-distorting measures is presented by the strategic vul-
nerability that exists when nations depend upon foreign sources of
strategic minerals and petroleum. The United States, for example,
has lessened its vulnerability resulting from reductions of petroleum
imports during international crises both by adopting import restraint
measures under Section 232, and by maintaining a Strategic Petro-
leum Reserve of crude oil. Section 232 measures restricted imports
while the Strategic Petroleum Reserve stimulates international trade,
as it is filled entirely with imported crude.
Japan has responded in similar fashion to reduce its strategic vul-
nerability in non-food areas. For example, it maintains a 142 day
stockpile of petroleum (the largest such stockpile in the world) in ten
locations scattered throughout the country.179
Just as nations that are vulnerable to reductions in imports of pe-
troleum maintain oil reserves, we should expect nations that are con-
cerned about their vulnerability to reductions in food imports would
maintain food stockpiles.180 In fact, the history of maintaining food
stockpiles to provide a measure of food security precedes the establish-
179. Japan's Oil Safety Net Will It Hold?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1991, at C1.
180. Naturally, storage methods for food and petroleum are different. Periodically,
supplies must be added to food stockpiles and released from the stockpile to the
market in order to maintain their edibility. But, in both cases the stockpile pro-
vides the security of additional resources to take the place of reduced imports
during an international crisis.
[Vol. 71:368
FOOD SECURITY CONCERNS
ment of petroleum stockpiles by at least several millennia,18 1 and con-
tinues, in part, as an inevitable result of current national farm support
programs.
The establishment of governmental food stockpiles pursuant to
GATT principles would allow contracting parties to obtain supplies
from a number of different sources. In many nations, the original
stock would come from excess supplies acquired by the government
pursuant to existing trade-distorting farm programs. After trade-dis-
torting programs were phased out, GATT Procurement Code signato-
ries and non-signatories would be subject to different rules as they
replenished their strategic reserves. Non-signatories could continue to
favor domestic suppliers, while signatories would be required to per-
mit other signatories to compete for their government procurement
contracts (subject to the Code's exceptions). Whatever the domestic
and foreign composition of the stockpile, however, the maintenance of
stockpiles sufficient to meet a large portion of the nation's needs over
the course of an extended conflict would permit it to decrease it's vul-
nerability to disruption of food imports during an international crisis.
It would be impossible to forecast the size and cost of a food stock-
pile that would be sufficient to meet the legitimate food security of
any particular nation without conducting a complex strategic analysis.
That process would require specific facts concerning the domestic sup-
ply of the relevant product, reliable estimates of changes in supply and
demand conditions during a crisis, reasonable estimates of changes in
domestic production resulting from the dismantling of trade-distorting
measures, and faith in the ability of analysts to predict the nature and
duration of a potential national emergency. The Australian Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource Economics recently used a novel approach
to bypass much of this analysis in its study of Japanese agricultural
policies.18 2 It began by recognizing that, in any event, a stockpile of a
particular commodity that was sufficient to meet the annual needs of
the Japanese population would serve national security interests just as
181. Upon realizing that the Pharaoh's dreams provided a warning that seven years of
abundance would be followed by seven years of famine, Joseph advised:
Let Pharaoh proceed to appoint overseers over the land and take the
fifth part of the produce of the land of Egypt during the seven plenteous
years. And let them gather all the food of these good years that are com-
ing, and lay up grain under the authority of Pharaoh for food in the cit-
ies, and let them keep it. That food shall be a reserve for the land
against the seven years of famine which are to befall the land of Egypt,
so that the land may not perish through the famine.
2 Gene6sis 41 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible).
The Pharaoh followed Joseph's advice. "The seven years of plenty that pre-
vailed in the land of Egypt came to an end; and the seven years of famine began to
come as Joseph had said. There was famine in all lands; but in all the land of
Egypt there was bread." Id.
182. JAPANE s AGRicuLTuRAL POLIcIEs, supra note 80.
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effectively as maintaining current levels of domestic production for a
year through its existing farm support programs. 8 3 Taking rice as an
example, the Bureau concluded that the cost of purchasing a one year
supply of rice on the world market, and storing and handling it for a
year, would be substantially less than the cost of maintaining Japan's
rice support programs for one year.'8 4
Nations that maintain strategic reserves of basic food stocks, would
continuously buy and sell products to maintain adequate levels of edi-
ble products. For example, if the "shelf life" of rice is three years,
one-third of the inventory would be bought and sold each year. 8 5
If nations were permitted to grant preferences to their domestic
producers in purchasing supplies for their strategic reserves of food
(which would be the case for contracting parties that have not signed
the Procurement Code), theoretically at least they might be able to
use food stockpiles as an effective substitute for current trade re-
straints. Returning to the rice stockpile example, a nation could main-
tain an effective total import ban by maintaining a stockpile at three
times the level of annual domestic consumption. Each year, it would
purchase the annual current domestic production at a preferential
price, and sell the oldest third of the stockpile to domestic consumers.
To guard against abuse, the size of the stockpile should be limited
to a maximum of one year's domestic consumption of the product in
question. Non-signatories to the Procurement Code could prefer their
own producers when they purchase supplies for the stockpile (just as
their government procurement agencies can prefer domestic produ-
cers of all other products), but the bulk of their private consumer mar-
ket would be open to competition from the most efficient foreign
producers.
In summary, food stockpiles appear to be customary, efficient and
cost-effective means of reducing a nation's vulnerability to disruptions
in the supply of food imports during wartime. Other measures such as
long-term bilateral food purchase agreements and private investments
in nations enjoying comparative advantages in agricultural production
could provide a measure of security during less serious international
crises. If a contracting party has not maintained food stockpiles at a
level suggested by reasonable strategic analyses or pursued other ef-
183. In fact, the population's total annual consumption of a particular commodity
probably would be at the extreme upper range of a reasonable stockpile. In rela-
tive terms, it would be about two and a half times as large as Japan's 142 day
supply of petroleum.
184. Id.
185. Stockpiles might not be feasible for extremely perishable products such as fresh
fruits and vegetables; but those products are not required for food security pur-
poses. In a crisis the nutritionable value of perishables can be provided by
canned, dried or other preserved varieties of those products, or alternative nutri-
tional sources.
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fective non-trade-distorting measures, it seems reasonable to infer
that its food security-based invocations of Article XXI are motivated
by the economic or political interests of domestic interests, rather
than by legitimate national security concerns. In those circumstances,
national-security based claims for import relief should not be
accepted.
A second proposed principle to be applied is that contracting par-
ties should not be authorized to impose ineffective trade-distorting
measures to protect food security. In some situations, domestic farm
support programs may be ineffective in ensuring food security, as well
as trade-distorting. For example, the maintenance of current levels of
food production in Japan is dependent upon the uninterrupted flow of
petroleum imports to produce fertilizers and pesticides, and to power
farm equipment and fishing fleets. Sharp declines in fertilizer sup-
plies alone would reduce Japanese yields of wheat and barley by 25
percent and rice by 30 percent. 86 Thus, if enemy naval forces cut off
Japan from foreign sources of petroleum during wartime, the costly
farm support programs that Japan currently maintains would not
forestall a food security crisis for very long.
If a contracting party seeking to justify a trade-distorting farm pro-
gram under Article XXI cannot employ a reasonable strategic analysis
to demonstrate that the program at issue would effectively contribute
to the achievement of legitimate national security objectives, it should
be prohibited.
The third proposed principle is based upon a judgment that no con-
tracting party requires total food self-sufficiency levels in order to
achieve adequate levels of food security. Several nations have an-
nounced that their goal is total domestic self-sufficiency in particular
commodities, or in agricultural production as a whole.'8 7 But, experi-
ence shows that nations do not need to achieve self-sufficiency levels
to meet legitimate food security objectives during wartime.
Changes in food consumption patterns during wartime can stretch
reduced food supplies without endangering the nutritional needs of
the population. Grains can be consumed directly by humans instead of
by livestock, which produce beef at a conversion rate of five to ten
pounds of grain for one pound of meat. Whole wheat bread can be
substituted for white bread, thereby utilizing the hulls and other parts
of the kernel that are discarded in the production of white bread.
186. Id.
187. For example, Japan's agricultural policy calls for self-sufficiency in rice produc-
tion (see Reich et aL, supra note 150 and accompanying text), while India seeks
total agricultural self-sufficiency. See generally David Greene, Agricultural Per-
formance and Policy in India: A Brief Overview and Some Lessons, in TRADE,
AID, AND POUCY REFORM: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH AGRICULTURAL SECrOR
SYMPosIuM (Colleen Roberts ed., 1988).
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Luxury food items can be eliminated from the diet.'8 8
Moreover, contrary to the assumptions of many advocates of food
security, domestic production often increases during wartime to cover
import shortfalls. Many Americans, for example, remember backyard
"Victory Garden" vegetables on their tables during World War II-
although the effort may have had more to do with promoting citizen
morale than increasing food production. In addition to similar pro-
grams, the United Kingdom, which had more significant food security
concerns, adopted a number of more ambitious measures to increase
domestic food production, including: reducing livestock levels, using
grazing land to produce cereals and potatoes, cultivating idle (usually
marginal) agricultural fields, and forcing inefficient farmers to turn
over their fields to more efficient managers. 8 9 These measures actu-
ally contributed to an increase in total U.K. caloric output from 18.7
billion calories in the average pre-war year to 29.0 billion calories in
1943-44 (an increase of 55 percent). 190
Thus, contracting parties should not be permitted to maintain
trade-distorting domestic farm support programs that produce non-es-
sential food products, or basic commodities in excess of reasonable
food security needs. The level of a nation's legitimate food security
needs must take into account the more efficient use of available food
resources and the surges in domestic food production that can be
achieved in wartime, as well as predicted sources of supply from politi-
cally and geographically-reliable exporters.
The fourth and final proposed principle prohibits the practice of
allowing contracting parties invoking Article XXI to be the sole judge
of their compliance with GATT food security-based import restraints.
Although GATT's history is replete with questionable trade practices,
broad exercises of self-judging powers and unresolved trade disputes,
by most accounts, contracting parties usually meet the modest goal of
observing their basic requirements most of the time, and avoiding bla-
tant violations. Indeed, that tolerance factor probably has been one of
the key factors in its relative success over the past four decades.
GATT's liberal tolerance factor, however, should not be trans-
formed into a self-judging clause should GATT's mainstream rules be
expanded to regulate agricultural trade. Although Article XXI may
have been applied on a virtual self-judging basis in practice with re-
spect to trade in manufactured goods over the past four decades, that
relatively non-controversial practice occurred in the context of trade
in a sector that had been subject to GATT's mainstream trade disci-
pline from the outset. Agricultural trade, by contrast, has been based
upon loopholes and national farm programs that run directly counter
188. OLSON, supra note 136, at 10.
189. Id. at 120-24.
190. Id. at 125.
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to GATT's mainstream principles. Accordingly, contracting parties
who invoke Article XXI to justify trade-distorting farm programs
should be subject to challenge by other parties, and required to
demonstrate that their programs meet legitimate food security inter-
ests (subject to the criteria discussed above) before GATT dispute res-
olution panels.
&i Resort to GATT Escape Clause
In some situations, domestic political pressures may force con-
tracting parties to restrict food imports or subsidize exports whether
or not legitimate food security needs can be achieved by other means.
In short, some contracting parties might be forced by domestic polit-
ical pressures, or their objective perception of legitimate food security
interests, to restrict food imports whether or not they can convince
their trading partners or GATT dispute resolution panels that such
actions are justified under a reasonable national security analysis.
As a practical matter, the contracting parties should recognize that
some important trading nations might withdraw from GATT if forced
to dismantle food security-based import restraints, no matter how un-
reasonable its justifications under a national security analysis may ap-
pear to the other parties. In some cases, it might become necessary to
force nations to choose between further participation in GATT or
maintaining important national policies. Those situations should be
avoided if possible.
GATT's existing Escape Clause,191 however, should provide the
flexibility needed to keep the most ardent agricultural protectionists
in GATT, without unfairly infringing upon the rights of parties that
are willing to abide by liberalized agricultural trade policies. Under
the Escape Clause:
If, as a result of unforseen developments and of the obligations incurred by a
contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any
product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive
products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to
the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such
injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify
the concession.192
Thus, contracting parties may impose trade restraints on imports
naturally flowing from countries enjoying comparative advantages in
the relevant industry, and resulting from entirely fair trade practices,
simply because the imported products cause, or threaten to cause, seri-
ous injury to the domestic industry. But, there is a price to be paid for
191. General Agreement, supra note 3, at Art. XIX.
192. Id. at Art. XIX.I(a).
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invoking the Escape Clause. After specified notification and consulta-
tion procedures are exhausted, if the exporting and importing coun-
tries cannot resolve their differences:
(1) the party invoking the Escape Clause may be free to adopt import re-
straint measures to protect the domestic industry that is injured or threatened
by imports; and
(2) parties adversely affected by such import restraints may suspend the "ap-
plication to the trade of the contracting party taking such action... of such
substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agree-
ment the suspension of which the contracting parties do not disapprove."1 9 3
In other words, when a contracting party invokes the Escape Clause, it
may be required to pay compensation to trading partners adversely
affected by that trade restraint.194
This element of flexibility should ameliorate the tension between
GATT's economic efficiency objectives and the most ardent protec-
tionist's food security objectives. If those nations can justify their im-
port restraints on the basis of a reasonable strategic supply analysis
(taking into account all relevant factors), they should be authorized to
invoke national security-based import restraints pursuant to Article
XXI without penalty. If they cannot, they should be permitted to im-
pose import restraints to meet perceived food security requirements
upon payment of appropriate compensation to contracting parties ad-
versely affected by those restraints.
3. Repeal of Existing GATT Rules Authorizing Agricultural
Export Embargoes
For the most part, the General Agreement's mainstream rules pro-
vide a suitable framework for balancing economic efficiency and food
security objectives. One provision, however, would seriously under-
mine any efforts to subject the agricultural sector to its trade
discipline.
After establishing the general principle prohibiting quantitative re-
strictions on imports or exports, Article XI of the General Agreement
goes on to authorize contracting parties to impose temporary export
prohibitions or restrictions "to relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs
or other products essential to the exporting contracting party."195
With this exception, GATT's architects undermined the confidence of
nations lacking agricultural comparative advantages in the reliability
193. Id. at Art. XIX.3(a).
194. Compensation is also required under Article XXIV.6 when the establishment or
expansion of free trade agreements and customs unions adversely affects trading
partners. For example, the EEC agreed to ensure minimum annual purchases of
about 2.7 metric tons of U.S. corn and sorghum to compensate the United States
for grain sales that allegedly were lost as a result of Spain's accession to the EEC.
Id. at Art. XXIV.6. See also 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 122 (Feb. 4, 1987).
195. General Agreement, supra note 3, at Art. XI.2.
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of food imports to meet the nutritional needs of their populations.
When the United States embargoed soybean exports pursuant to this
provision in 1973, the potential unreliability of food imports became a
reality.16
If nations that enjoy a comparative advantage in agriculture wish
to exploit that economic efficiency to its fullest extent by exporting
freely to foreign markets, they should be willing to forsake the short-
supply exceptions to increase net agricultural importers' assurance of
continued supplies. At most, contracting parties should be allowed to
reserve a portion of the available domestic production equal to the av-
erage proportion of domestic sales to total sales over a representative
period.197
4. New International Assurances
In addition to the confidence-building measures that are or could
be incorporated in GATT, net agricultural importers can adopt a
number of self-help commercial measures that would enhance food
security without distorting natural trade flows. For example, net food
importers can enter into long-term supply contracts with foreign pro-
ducers and encourage joint ventures and other private investments in
those countries that produce agricultural products most efficiently.
The major limitation to most self-help commercial measures, how-
ever, is they are often among the first casualties of war or severe inter-
national emergencies.
As noted in the discussion of strategic supply methodologies that
should be used to judge the validity of national security-based trade
restraints, some common self-help measures can enhance food secur-
ity without distorting trade. For example, nations can import food
from geographically and politically reliable producers and maintain
food reserves.
In the future, nations concerned with their vulnerability to curtail-
ments of food imports during war time might also seek assurances
from international sources. For example, they might take the initia-
tive in establishing independent international institutions to acquire,
manage and control the distribution of emergency international food
stockpiles. Those nations might also take the lead in clarifying the
196. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
197. For an illustration of this proposal, assume that over the representative period an
average of 25 million tons of U.S. wheat were consumed per year in the United
States, and an average of 25 million tons were consumed in foreign markets (total
average sales of 50 million tons per year). If U.S. wheat production fell to 40
million tons in the year in question, a maximum of 20 million tons could be re-
served for the domestic market (i-e., the same percentage of this year's crop as
the percentage of crops consumed in foreign markets over the representative
period).
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rules of international humanitarian law by recognizing (at a mini-
mum) that, in times of war or other international emergencies, civil-
ian populations of belligerent nations have an absolute right to import
food.198
5. Summary
The contracting parties' Uruguay Round negotiators probably
would have been able to balance economic efficiency and food security
objectives long ago if either of those competing objectives were insub-
stantial, or if both objectives could be quantified and one was demon-
strated to be less substantial than the other. It is much more difficult
to balance the enormous $200 billion potential gain in economic effi-
ciency against the incalculable potential costs that could be paid by the
civilian populations of net food importing nations whose food imports
can be interdicted during wars or other international emergencies.
Our experience in balancing GATT's economic efficiency and national
security objectives, however, provides a solid basis for concluding that
legitimate food security concerns can be accommodated within the
framework of GATT's existing system.
B. Less Ambitious Solution for Trade among Developed Countries
In any event, the contracting parties should recognize that no na-
tion's legitimate or perceived food security objectives can justify the
subsidization of agricultural exports. All conceivable food security
objectives are fulfilled when a nation produces one hundred percent of
its population's nutritional needs. Thus, subsidies that reduce the cost
of its agricultural products in export markets (whether labeled domes-
tic or export subsidies) distort international agricultural trade without
increasing the exporting nation's food security.
The contracting parties eventually may conclude that food security
concerns (or other non-economic objectives) are so entrenched in the
agricultural policies of some of the key trading nations that their mar-
kets simply will not be opened in the foreseeable future-whatever
the implication of that fact on agricultural trade in particular, or
GATT in general. If they fail in their attempt to devise a balance be-
198. As with most issues of public international law, it would be easier for the interna-
tional community to recognize this right than to enforce it. The combination of
United Nation's influence, collective and individual self-help, diplomacy and
other horizontal enforcement measures, however, has led Professor Henkin and
other authorities to conclude that: "It is probably the case that almost all nations
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obliga-
tions almost all the time." L. HENREN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
This usual observance of the rules of international law even applies to rules gov-
erning the conduct of war. L. Henkin, Law and War qfter the Cold War, 15 MD.
J. INTL. L. & TRADE 1 (1992).
[Vol. 71:368
FOOD SECURITY CONCERNS
tween economic efficiency and food security goals that would work
across the agricultural trade spectrum, at least they should be able to
find a way to permit those objectives to coexist. Rather than return to
the status quo on agricultural trade (or worse), the contracting parties
could permit food security concerns to prevail internally, while apply-
ing normal GATT rules to promote its economic efficiency objectives
in international markets. In the words of a recent Institute of Interna-
tional Economics policy analysis: "If a country chooses to have agri-
cultural programs that make its agriculture less competitive, it should
have the right to do so, as long as the programs do not expand agricul-
tural output at the expense of other [nations'] producers."199
As a nation's agricultural programs can expand output at the ex-
pense of other nations' producers in a variety of ways, the implemen-
tation of this concept would require changes in a number of trade-
distorting measures. Certainly, contracting parties would be required
to dismantle explicit export subsidies, such as the U.S. Export En-
hancement Program and EEC export subsidies, which distort export
trade in an obvious manner by providing bonus payments to eligible
producers for each ton (or other unit of volume) exported.
Not as obviously, the contracting parties would be required to re-
vise domestic subsidy programs that reduce the cost of that portion of
domestic output that is sold in international markets. For example, if
one-half of U.S. wheat production were exported over a representative
period, the payment base for the U.S. deficiency payment program
(i.e., the acreage which is eligible for the program) could be reduced
by one-half. If it wished, the United States could double the deficiency
payment rate to produce the same level of farm income support on the
smaller base, and the farmer could produce wheat for export on the
remaining acreage without governmental support or control.2 00 The
implementation of this alternative would require similar types of ad-
justments for the existing domestic farm price support programs of all
contracting parties.20 '
C. Trade with LDCs
Most of the literature on agricultural trade liberalization has em-
phasized the benefits that developed countries would gain by phasing
out the trade-distorting aspects of current domestic farm support pro-
grams. Using $200 billion as a ball park estimate of the cost of those
subsidies, the potential benefits that would accrue to taxpayers and
consumers in developing countries as those transfers to farmers were
curtailed is readily apparent. Moreover, the economic models dis-
199. HATHAwAY, supra note 49, at 144 (emphasis in original).
200. Id. at 153.
201. Id. at 144-53.
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cussed earlier suggest that net welfare benefits in most developed
countries would be of sufficient magnitude to permit the contracting
parties to maintain present farm income levels through decoupled
subsidies, while reducing taxpayer and consumer outlays.
Many LDCs food security concerns, however, are broader, and
more immediate, than the concerns of developed countries. For some
LDCs, the food security crisis is immediate and devastating while for
others, it is only as far away as the next bad harvest. In either situa-
tion, while LDCs share the developed countries' potential vulnerabil-
ity resulting from wartime disruptions to food imports, that risk
would seem remote in comparison to their continual struggle to meet
their citizens' nutritional needs.
1. Immediate Effects of Agricultural Trade Liberalization
For most LDCs, the most immediate impact of a decision by indus-
trialized countries to eliminate trade-distorting subsidies would be a
substantial increase in the price of the agricultural products in the
world market. As noted previously, the IASA model forecasted a ten
percent increase in world market prices.
Although LDCs share many common concerns, agricultural trade
liberalization would not have a uniform effect on these countries.
Many LDCs' interests would be served by a liberal agricultural trade
system (subject only to the exceptions available to all contracting par-
ties).20 2 Some would benefit immediately while others would benefit
over the long run.
Some LDCs, such as Argentina and Thailand, have been able to
compete rather successfully in international markets over the past
decade without matching the subsidy levels of the United States, the
EEC and Japan. If the United States and the EEC eliminated current
subsidies that enhance their exporters' competitive position in domes-
tic or international markets, LDCs that enjoy comparative advantages
in agricultural production would begin to bring their economic effi-
ciencies to bear in international markets in short order.203 The IASA
econometric model's predictions of changes in agricultural trade pat-
202. The United States' Uruguay Round has proposed that special and differential ag-
ricultural trade rules be applied to LDCs. See U.S. Agricultural Trade Proposal,
supra note 43, at 1398. In summary, LDCs would be permitted to maintain trade-
distorting programs that developed contracting parties were required to disman-
tle, without forfeiting their right to export to developed countries pursuant to the
proposed liberal agricultural trade regime. The issues that are most relevant to
this discussion are whether LDCs would be adversely affected by the developing
countries elimination current farm programs that lower the world market price
of food, and whether the LDCs should open up their markets to a liberal agricul-
tural trade system.
203. Cf. G. Edward Schuh, Some Neglected Agricultural Policy Issues in the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in TRADE, AID, AND PoLicy REFORM:
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terns among the major agricultural exporters and importers under an
agricultural trade liberalization scenario suggests that India, Pakistan,
Argentina and Thailand might substantially increase their net export
earnings. 204
Another example of potential LDC beneficiaries is illustrated by
the changes in trade flows that could be anticipated if the United
States opened up its market to sugar imports. Under the United
States original Uruguay Round proposal, it could initially substitute a
duty rate of 102 percent for current raw sugar import quotas,205 and
then phase out the duty over a ten year transition period. Since a
number of Caribbean and Latin American LDCs are among the most
efficient producers of sugar, the opening of the U.S. market would en-
able them to substantially increase exports and foreign exchange
earnings, reduce their foreign debts and increase their import
purchases.206
Many LDCs, however, are net agricultural importers. For many of
these countries, any increase in their agricultural export earnings
would be insufficient to compensate for the higher cost of food imports
resulting from the elimination of subsidies by developed nations. The
net increase in food costs could be crippling to LDCs experiencing low
or negative rates of economic growth.
2. Long Term Effects of Agricultural Trade Liberalization
In the long run, however, the proponents of agricultural trade lib-
eralization who have forecasted the impact of those policies on LDCs
often argue that even net agricultural importers would benefit from
the elimination of trade-distorting farm subsidies.
The opportunity for net food-importing LDCs to purchase food im-
ports at subsidized prices may even increase their food security
problems, by depressing domestic food prices and eliminating their
farmers' ability to recover costs of production. As world market food
prices increase to account for the elimination of subsidies in developed
countries, farmers in LDCs should have more incentive to increase
production. 2 07
Moreover, many LDC farmers enjoy a natural form of protection-
ism that would enable them to be competitive in their own countries
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH AGRICULTURE SECTOR SYMPOSIUM (Colleen Roberts
ed., 1988).
204. Appendix, Table E.
205. Appendix, Table A.
206. T. Volrath, Developmental Consequences of Unrestricted Trade, U.S. Department
of Agriculture Economic Research Service Foreign Agricultural Report No. 213,
6-9 (1985).
207. THE WoRLD FOOD INsrrrUTE, WORLD FOOD TRADE AND U.S. AGRICULTURE, 1960-
1987, at 67 (1988).
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even if they are not among the world's most efficient producers of
their crops. Particularly in landlocked countries and countries with
poor transport and infrastructure systems, the world market price is
not particularly relevant. By the time a delivered price to an ultimate
destination in the hinterland is fixed (by adding distribution costs to
the world market price), a local farmer with relatively high costs of
production may be able to compete quite effectively with the most effi-
cient farmers in countries enjoying all of the comparative
advantages. 208
3. Effect of Agricultural Trade Liberalization on Food Aid
Many LDCs, however, do not have the luxury of planning for the
long run. For an LDC that is struggling to generate the foreign cur-
rency reserves needed to purchase subsidized food imports in suffi-
cient quantity to meet the minimum nutritional needs of its
population, the forecasted ten percent increase in food prices resulting
from agricultural trade liberalization could be catastrophic. As noted
previously, some studies suggest an increase in world market price
levels of as little as one percent per year could increase the number of
hungry people in LDCs by more than 900 million people.
Some of the most effective measures that could be adopted to pro-
tect legitimate LDC food security needs do not raise difficult trade
issues. For example, a World Bank staff working paper suggests that
developed countries could most effectively insulate LDCs from the
shock of higher international food prices, or adverse fluctuations in
currency exchange rates, by providing direct cash grants.209 Compar-
ing the size of the $200 billion savings that would accrue primarily to
developed countries through the elimination of trade-distorting subsi-
dies to their total foreign aid assistance of approximately $27 billion
per year in 1980,210 suggests that those grants could be generated by
transferring a portion of developing country benefits to LDCs.
Other reliable international food security measures would raise
only collateral trade issues. For example, the maintenance of interna-
tional food stockpiles might provide the necessary degree of assurance
that food stocks would be available in case of natural disasters (such as
droughts, floods, crop infestations and other causes of bad harvests)
and economic emergencies (such as shortages of foreign currency
reserves occasioned by sudden declines in demand for an LDC's pri-
mary exports).
208. Ian Goldin & Odin Knudsen, The Implications of Agricultural Trade Liberaliza-
tion for Developing Countries, in AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: IMPU-
CATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 481 (1990).
209. World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 393, in FOOD SECURITY IN FOOD DEFICIT
COUNTRIES 3 (1980); see also PARIKH, supra note 95, at 231.
210. PARiKH, supra note 95, at 119, 113.
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Trade issues would arise primarily in the context of the standards
to be used for obtaining supplies for the stockpiles. Under the pre-
ferred approach suggested in this article, for example, the developed
countries might provide an international stockpile administrator with
sufficient funds to purchase those supplies on straight commercial
terms from the most efficient agricultural exporters.
If the contracting parties adopted the less ambitious solution, how-
ever, countries that maintained domestic price support programs
might be convinced to donate any surpluses not needed to assure do-
mestic food security needs to the stockpile. Excess supplies might in-
advertently result from higher than expected yields. Alternatively,
those countries might find it politically desirable (in both the domestic
and international sense) to deliberately encourage production some-
what in excess of domestic needs, and donate excess supplies to inter-
national food stockpiles, as a means of supporting domestic farm
income and providing crucial foreign aid, without unduly distorting
international commercial markets.
Other measures, particularly governmental programs that permit
LDCs to purchase food on concessional terms, would have a more di-
rect effect on trade policy. The U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation,
for example, provides export financing and loan guarantees to U.S.
agricultural exporters at less than prevailing market rates. If U.S. ex-
porters had to obtain comparable financing and insurance through the
private market, we would expect both their costs and the prices paid
by LDCs to increase. The United States also sells surplus agricultural
products to LDCs under concessionary terms pursuant to PL-480 by
accepting payment in local, non-convertible currencies, and applying
those currencies to economic development projects in the recipient
country.
If the developed countries agree to insulate LDCs from some of the
risks of opening their markets to a liberal international agricultural
trade system by means other than cash grants or outright donations of
food, they may consider establishing additional concessionary sales
programs. For example, some policy analysts have suggested that
grain insurance programs would provide the necessary measure of as-
surance to LDCs that they will not be subject to wild fluctuations in
international commodity prices if they place more reliance on the
world market.211 In order to extend this assurance to LDCs that could
not afford to pay the premiums for that type of insurance program,
major agricultural nations might be willing to offer it at no cost or at
below market rates.
The purist's free trade approach would be to authorize outright
211. Johnson, Grain Insurance, Reserves, and Trade. Contributions to Food Security
for LDC, in FOOD SEcusrry FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1981).
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food aid, but prohibit sales to LDCs on concessional terms. If the de-
veloped countries provided cash grants to LDCs that could be used to
purchase food from any source, the comparative advantage ideal
would flourish as LDCs imported their food from the most efficient
producers. In recognition of political realities, however, most free
trade advocates probably would not object to contracting parties' dona-
tions of surplus commodities to LDCs. Even though the donation
might have some adverse effects on other agricultural exporters that
might have obtained a sale to the LDC but for the donation, at least
the donor country's motivation probably would not be to gain a com-
mercial advantage.
Countries offering agricultural commodities to LDCs on conces-
sional terms, however, usually do so to promote a diverse range of
charitable and commercial interests, including: the enhancement of
domestic farm incomes; the development of close trading relations,
particularly if there are prospects for commercial sales to the LDC in
the future; and the alleviation of hunger in the recipient country.
Thus, concessional sales may adversely affect the interests of the most
efficient agricultural exporting nations by distorting natural trade
flows, while providing valuable commercial advantages to less effi-
cient producers in the country offering the concessionary terms.
This is one of those cases in which no amount of refining the provi-
sions of the General Agreement to establish balancing tests or flexible
trade rules will solve the dilemma. We have to choose between two
important principles. Either we conclude that the economic efficiency
objectives are predominant, and therefore prohibit trade-distorting
concessionary sales to LDCs; or we conclude that it is more important
to encourage the international community to provide food aid by any
means that can be supported through the domestic political process,
even if it means that the most efficient agricultural exporting nations
cannot exploit their comparative advantage to its full potential.
In this instance, when food security is not an abstract or hypotheti-
cal issue but involves decisions as to whether tens of millions of addi-
tional people in LDCs will be denied minimum nutritional
requirements as food prices increase, free trade theory simply cannot
be pushed to its ultimate limits. We should be willing to accept ex-
plicit provisions in the General Agreement authorizing the con-
tracting parties to provide any type of food aid they wish, including
donations and sales on concessionary terms, to LDCs that are subject
to immediate and severe food security crises.
VI. CONCLUSION
GATT's architects understood the need to create an international
trade system that respects both free market economics and the con-
tracting parties' essential social and security policies. Over the past
[Vol. 7/1:368
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four decades, the GATT system has induced the contracting parties to
permit principles of comparative advantage to act as the basic determi-
nate of flows of trade in manufactured products, while reserving their
right to divert natural international trade flows when necessary to
protect essential national security interests. With a few adaptations,
GATT's rules-oriented system for balancing economic and non-eco-
nomic objectives can, and should, be employed to extend its trade dis-
cipline to agricultural products, while assuring contracting parties that
they may adopt reasonable measures to protect their legitimate food
security interests.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A
ESTIMATED TARIFF EQUIVALENTS OF U.S. QUOTAS ON
SELECTED AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS
Ad valorem Specific
Item 1986 1987 1988 1986 1987 1988
Raw Sugar
Refined Sugar
Boneless Cow Beef
Peanuts: In-shell,
unroasted
Shelled, unroasted
or roasted
Cotton:
Type "A"
Type "B"
EIS cotton
------ percent ------ cents/kilogram ----
223 203 102 29.76 30.01 22.80
163 163 62 32.01 32.28 19.52
1.6 6.1 2.9 12.2
34.3-51.2 35.7-52.8 69.1-90.1 6.9-10.3 7.1-10.5 11.2-14.6
31.4-38.6 32.4-39.7 55.2-63.6 12.7-15.6 13.0-15.9 19.1-22.0
7-25 0-8
17-40 0-7
0-4 0
0-4 7.19-24.67 0-10.94 0-5.20
0-7 12.83-30.31 0-8.40 0-7.17
0 0-9.04 0.00 0.00
Dairy:
Dry Whole Milk 160.6 164.1 64.5 148.4 151.3 97.5
Nonfat Dry Milk 142.5 67.6 5.7 99.9 68.3 9.3
Butter 190.2 182.1 95.9 192.5 177.5 128.3
Butteroil 273.7 271.2 200.9 321.7 312.2 271.0
Cheddar Cheese 132.5 121.8 47.3 145.8 134.0 78.0
Source: U.S. Tariff Equivalents, supra note 108, at xvi.
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TABLE B
ESTIMATED TARIFF EQUIVALENTS OF CERTAIN FOREIGN
NONTARIFF BARRIERS ON AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS
Importing country/ Ad valorem Specific
region and item 1986 1987 1988 1986 1987 1988
- -- percent ... ...- cents/kilogram - - -
European Community.
Dairy products:
Butter ........................ 212 65 166 214 64 222
Cheddar cheese ................ 275 95 182 302 105 301
Nonfat dry milk ............... 471 115 179 330 116 292
Sugar ........................... 188 222 170 25 33 38
Wheat ........................... 96 100 76 8 9 10
Japan:
Dairy products:
Butter ...................... 595 648 507 601 635 679
Nonfat dry milk ............. 344 250 144 241 253 234
Sugar ......................... 542 542 360 72 80 81
Rice .......................... 733 620 700 160 183 204
Canada
Dairy products:
Butter ...................... 270 308 223 273 302 299
Cheddar cheese ............. 295 317 218 325 349 360
Nonfat dry milk ............. 189 113 44 132 114 72
Eggs and poultry:
Eggs ...................... ..... 13 36 35 9 21 22
Chicken ........................ 15 29 12 19 32 16
Turkey ......................... 28 58 24 46 77 35
1Specific rates are in cents per dozen.
Source: Foreign Tariff Equivalents, supra note 108, at vL
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TABLE C
TOTAL TRANSFERS ASSOCIATED WITH AGRICULTURAL
POLICIES
(in billion U.S. dollars) 1986-89
Transfers from Transfers from Budget Total transfers
Country taxpayers (1) consumers (2) revenues (3) (1)+(2)-(3)
United States
1986 59.4 29.6 0.9 88.1
1987 50.3 30.4 0.7 80.0
1988 49.1 26.0 0.8 74.3
1989 46.3 21.6 0.7 67.2
EC-12
1986 31.7 71.9 0.7 102.9
1987 38.2 78.3 0.7 115.9
1988 45.8 63.7 0.7 108.8
1989 44.1 54.1 0.7 97.5
Japan
1986 13.9 48.8 8.6 54.1
1987 18.4 55.3 10.4 63.3
1988 18.7 60.8 13.7 65.9
1989 15.6 52.4 10.2 57.8
Cada
1986 4.4 3.6 0.1 7.9
1987 5.7 3.6 0.1 9.2
1988 5.1 3.6 0.1 8.6
1989 4.2 3.1 0.1 7.2
A.uralia
1986 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.9
1987 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.7
1988 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.6
1989 0.3 0.4 0. 0.6
Notes:
(1) "Transfers from taxpayers" corresponds to public expenditures for agriculture
under the following items: research, training, extension, inspection services and dis-
ease control, rationalization of production, structural improvement, rural develop-
ment, processing, marketing, subsidies to consumers, and price and income support.
It concerns federal expenditure and expenditure by the States, Provinces and
LAnder respectively for the United States and Australia, for Canada, and for Austria
and Germany. For the EEC, these expenditures cover not only community ex-
penses but also Member States expenses.
(2) 'Transfers from consumers" was estimated as the impact of these policies at the
borders (customs duties or equivalent) on domestic prices; it was calculated per
product applying the corresponding tariffs or the difference between the domestic
and foreign prices to the respective levels of consumption and deducting consumer
subsidies borne by taxpayers.
(3) "Budget revenues" arising from price distortions should only exist for the products
in which a country is not self-sufficient; they were estimated by multiplying the
tariff or the price differential by the difference between the consumption and pro-
duction levels of these products.
Sources: OECD, Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade Monitoring and Outlook
1989, at 80, 81 (1989); OECD, Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade: Monitoring and
Outlook 1990, at 111, 113 (1990).
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TABLE D
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN GLOBAL TRADE, PRODUCTION,
AND HUMAN CONSUMPTION UNDER OECD TRADE
LIBERALIZATION RELATIVE TO THE REFERENCE
SCENARIO IN 1990 AND 2000
Production Trade Consumption
Commodity 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Wheat 1.1 0.5 -3.0 -1.5 -0.6 -0.8
Rice 1.2 1.2 42.8 37.4 -0.1 0.0
Coarse grains 0.7 1.7 -6.5 -4.5 -0.4 -0.4
Bovine and ovine 0.9 3.3 33.0 34.9 1.0 3.5
Dairy 0.8 1.9 19.9 12.5 0.9 1.0
Other animal products 0.4 0.8 6.2 16.8 0.3 0.7
Protein feed 2.5 2.0 5.1 5.0 -0.1 -0.2
Other food 0.3 0.2 4.2 10.1 0.4 0.3
Nonfood agriculture 0.2 -1.5 5.0 5.1 0.6 1.4
Nonagriculture 0.0 -0.0 15.4 17.0 0.2 0.4
Source: PARKHm, supr note 95, at 96 (Table 5.5).
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TABLE E
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE
PATTERNS IN 2000 UNDER OECD TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TO THE REFERENCE SCENARIO
Other
Coarse Bovine animal Protein Other Non-
Country Wheat Rice grains & ovine Dairy products feed food food
USA 19 6 12 114 -177 +b 3 7 b
Canada -9 -4 -79 108 +b 36 -82 -79 30
Australia 5 -2 -53 75 150 -110 45 -3 15
New Zealand -30 1 111 25 27 -85 53 18 18
Austria -38 -2 -199 -43 235 137 -5 28 19
EC -98 89 -61 79 -60 -363 -12 26 13
Japan 2 1173 9 40 128 50 57 68 5
CMEA 20 1 7 0 +b 0 _b 84 -5
Argentina -6 58 -41 75 507 112 10 90 30
Brazil 1 -58 -8 -28 -22 1 11 65 -11
Mexico -41 -74 -30 -98 +b 3 -12 39 72
Egypt -8 +b 3 -8 -1 5 -162 84 7
Kenya -14 +b 2 116 +b 58 142 9 -5
Nigeria -1 -2 -24 -12 2 0 195 -116 -8
India 22 10 -21 -14 +b 20 0 +b -9
Indonesia -2 0 -9 -28 -13 -3 -3 -4 21
Pakistan 86 -4 33 -69 -12 2 3 -57 3
Thailand 0 148 14 41 0 -50 -1 14 16
Turkey -43 294 15 39 28 5 _b 24 3
World -2 37 -5 35 13 17 5 10 5
In all similar tables the percentage change figures for trade should be interpreted with
care. A negative percentage change implies reduction in net exports or imports. A
negative percentage change that exceeds 100 shows a reversal of trade direction. A
positive percentage change shows an increase in traded quantity.
b No percentage change is given when the traded volume in the reference scenario does
not exceed 2% of domestic disappearance. In these cases a plus is used to indicate an
increase in net exports (increased export or decreased import), and a minus is used to
indicate a decrease in net exports.
Source: PARiKH, supra note 95, at 104 (Table 5.11).
FOOD SECURITY CONCERNS
TABLE F
PROJECTED NUMBER OF PEOPLE AND SHARE OF
POPULATION WITH CALORIE INTAKES BELOW
REQUIREMENTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES BY REGIONS
1990 Constant food urice Rising food urice (1% year)
Income zrowth* Income Qrowth*
Region 1965 1973 Low High Low High
----- million people (share of total population) ----
A. Calorie Intake Below FAO/WHO Requirements
Latin America 97(.49) 115(.46) 103(.26) 74(.18) 111(.27) 82(.20)
Asia 540(.71) 613(.67) 643(.49) 527(.40) 707(.53) 589(.44)
Middle East 45(.52) 49(.47) 47(.30) 37(.24) 52(.33) 41(.26)
Africa 22(.59 31.) 39(.46) 3 3 1 36(.42
Total 704(.66) 808(.61) 832(.42) 671(.34) 913(.46) 748(.38)
B. Calorie Intake Below 907 of FAO/WHO Requirements
Latin America 72(.37) 92(.37) 59(.15) 41(.10) 76(.19) 48(.12)
Asia 456(.56) 448(.49) 394(.30) 312(.34) 456(.34) 363(.27)
Middle East 34(.40) 34(.33) 31(.20) 23(.15) 29(.18) 26.(16)
Africa 16(.4 2.53 294 22,26) 3.38) 25(9
Total 578(.50) 599(.46) 513(.26) 398(.20) 593(.30) 462(2)
* Low "income growth" refers to the historical growth rates (1960-74) in per capita
income in the respective countries, except that where the growth rate was lower
than 1% growth was assumed. High income refers to 1.5 times the historical
growth rates in the respective countries, or 1.5% annually, whichever was greater.
Source: World Bank, The Prevalence of Calorie Deficient Diets in Developing
Countries (Working Paper No. 374) 21 (Table 5) (1980).
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